



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT

REPORT

April 1991

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Preface

This information has been assembled to support the 1991 Department of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments inside the United States.

The Secretary of Defense transmitted his recommended closures and realignments to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and to the Congress in April, 1991. The recommendations were also published in the Federal Register.

Chapter Four of this report contains the statutory recommendations, justifications and process summaries the Secretary of Defense transmitted to the Commission and the Congress pursuant to Public Law 101-510.

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Executive Summary

This report describes the Department of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The recommendations were submitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Commission in April of 1991, as authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. The recommendations were also transmitted to the Congress and filed with the Federal Register, as required by the Act.

The list of military installations inside the United States for closure or realignment is based on the force structure plan and the final criteria, as required by the Act. The list includes **43** bases recommended for closure and 28 bases recommended for realignment. Total costs to implement these recommendations are expected to be \$5.7 billion between fiscal years 1992 and 1997. These costs could be offset by about \$1.9 billion in expected land value. Total savings during the same period are expected to be **\$6.5** billion. The annual recurring savings beginning in fiscal year 1998 will total about \$1.7 billion.

The Department of Defense is reducing and reshaping its military forces to adapt to changes in the strategic environment, and to meet the challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War era. The changes, challenges and opportunities, as well as the new defense strategy and the forces required to implement the strategy, are described in the force structure plan which is part of this report.

The reshaping of the U.S. armed forces will continue through the Fiscal Year 1992-1997 multi-year defense program, consistent with the world situation and the availability of resources for national defense. By fiscal year 1995:

- o* The Army will have **6** fewer active divisions, which represents **a 33** percent reduction. Active duty Army personnel will decline by 215,000 (almost 30 percent).

- o The Navy will have one fewer aircraft carrier and two fewer carrier air wings. Navy battle force ships will decline from 545 to 451 ships. That represents a 17 percent reduction. The Navy will have 73,000 fewer active duty personnel, a decline of 13 percent. The Navy will retain a significant sealift capability.
- o The Marine Corps will retain its four divisions but reduce active duty personnel by 15 percent.
- o There will be nine fewer active Air Force tactical fighter wings, a 37 percent reduction, and one less reserve component wing. The Air Force will also have 87 fewer strategic bombers, a decline of 32 percent. Active duty Air Force personnel will decline by 102,000, a 19 percent reduction. The Air Force will retain a substantial airlift capability.

The reductions in the resources available to the Department over the multi-year defense program are substantial. The Department is committed to strengthening defense management and streamlining the defense infrastructure to extract the greatest national security value from increasingly scarce resources. The Department must balance its force structure and its base structure, closing those bases that are no longer needed to support the force structure. The Secretary's list of recommended closures and realignments is at Table I.

Table 1 -- Recommended Closures

Department of the Army

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Devens, MA
Fort Dix, NJ
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort Ord, CA
Sacramento Army Depot, CA
Harry Diamond Lab Woodbridge Research Fac, VA

Department of the Navy

Chase Field Naval Air Station, TX
Hunters Point Annex, CA
Long Beach Naval Station, CA
Moffett Field Naval Air Station, CA
Orlando Naval Training Center, FL
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA
Philadelphia Naval Station, PA
Sand Point (Puget Sound) Naval Station, WA
Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, CA
Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA
10 RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Activities
Davisville Construction Battalion Center, RI

Department of the Air Force

Bergstrom AFB, TX
Carswell AFB, TX
Castle AFB, CA
Eaker AFB, AR
England AFB, LA
Grissom AFB, IN
Loring AFB, ME
Lowry AFB, CO
Moody AFB, GA
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC
Richards-Gebaur ARS, MO
Rickenbacker AGB, OH
Williams AFB, AZ
Wurtsmith AFB, MI

Table 1 -- Recommended Realignments

Department of the Army

Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA
Aviation Sys Cmd/Troop Spt Cmd, St. Louis, MO
Fort Belvoir, VA
Fort Detrick, MD
Fort Monmouth, NJ
Fort Polk, LA
Harry Diamond Laboratories, MD
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Rock Island Arsenal, IL
White Sands Missile Range, NM

Department of the Navy

Midway Island Naval Air Facility, Midway
16 RDT&E Engineering and Fleet Support Activities

Department of the Air Force

MacDill AFB, FL

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 established new procedures for closing or realigning military installations inside the United States. The Act established an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary's base closure and realignment recommendations.

The Act specifies procedures which the Congress, the President, the Department of Defense, the General Accounting Office, the General Services Administration, and the Commission must follow to close or realign bases. The Act also specifies procedures for carrying out approved closures and realignments. The procedures are described in this report.

The linchpins of the base closure and realignment selection process are the force structure plan and the final criteria. The Department was required by the Act to develop proposed criteria, obtain public comments and publish the final criteria. This report describes the criteria development process and contains an

unclassified summary of the force structure plan. Besides the Secretary's recommendations for base closures and realignments, this report also summarizes the selection process, and describes the justification for each recommendation.

In fiscal year 1990 the Department began to implement the approved recommendations of the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. These 1988 closures, coupled with the closures described in this report, will result in the closure of approximately nine percent of the domestic military base structure. This report also describes the Department's recommendations to change some of the approved realignments or designated receiving bases from the 1988 Base Closure Commission report to meet changed circumstances.

The Department is reducing its need for overseas bases. The Secretary has the authority to end or reduce operations overseas, and return those sites to the host nation. To date, the Secretary has announced almost 200 such actions. Substantial additional announcements are planned for the next several years.

Closing military bases is difficult, especially for the communities affected. The Department has for years managed programs designed to assist communities, homeowners and employees in adjusting to the closure of bases.

- o The Department's Office of Economic Adjustment has, for almost 30 years, helped local communities plan for the reuse of closing bases. This program has enjoyed considerable success and most communities have recovered economically from base closures.
- o The Homeowners Assistance Program helps the Department's military and civilian employees sell their homes, if they are forced to move as a consequence of base closures.
- o The DoD Priority Placement Program helps the Department's civilian employees find alternate employment. This program has also been successful, particularly when employees are willing to relocate.

The Department is committed to environmentally restoring contaminated sites at defense installations. The Department has several initiatives underway to expedite the environmental restoration process.

Chapter 1

Base Closure Procedures

Public Law 101-510

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510) established new procedures for closing or realigning military installations inside the United States.

The Act established an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The Commission is charged with reviewing the base closure and realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995. The Commission will not meet during calendar years 1992 or 1994.

The Act specifies procedures which the Congress, the President, the Department of Defense (DoD), the General Accounting Office, the General Services Administration, and the Commission must follow in order for bases to be closed or realigned inside the United States (see Appendix A). The Act defines "United States" to be the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. The Act also establishes certain thresholds for applicability of the Act to closures and realignments, which are those established in section 2687, title 10, United States Code (see Appendix B).

1991 DoD Base Closure Actions

Public Law 101-510 required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1992 through 1997. The Act requires that the Secretary's recommendations for closure or realignment be based on this force structure plan. The plan is summarized in Chapter 2. The complete force structure plan, which was provided to the Commission and to the Congress, is classified SECRET.

Public Law 101-510 also required the Secretary of Defense to develop criteria to be used in selecting bases for closure and realignment. In developing the criteria, the Secretary was required to publish proposed criteria in the Federal Register and solicit public comments. Chapter 3 describes the steps taken by DoD in developing the final criteria (also see Appendix C). The final criteria were subject to Congressional review between February 15, 1991, and March 15, 1991. The criteria became final on March 15, 1991.

Public Law 101-510 authorizes the Secretary of Defense, no later than April 15, 1991, to publish in the Federal Register, and transmit to the congressional defense committees and the Commission a list of military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force structure plan and the final criteria. This report describes the recommendations the Secretary made and transmitted to the Commission, the congressional defense committees, and the Federal Register. The recommendations, selection process, and justifications are summarized in Chapter 4.

Finally, the Department of Defense issued policy guidance to the Military Departments regarding the base closure and realignment analysis process, including guidance on application of the force structure plan and the final criteria. These memoranda are at Appendix D.

The 1991 Commission

Public Law 101-510 established a Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary of Defense's base closure and realignment recommendations. The members of the Commission are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.

The Commission is required to conduct public hearings on the recommendations. The Commission must report to the President by July 1, 1991, on its findings, conclusions and recommendations for closures and realignments inside the United States.

The Commission may make changes in any of the Secretary's recommendations if the Commission determines that the Secretary

deviated substantially from the force structure plan and the final criteria in making recommendations. The Commission is required to explain and justify in its report to the President any recommendation that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary.

The Role of the General Accounting Office

Public Law 101-510 provided for the General Accounting Office (GAO) to monitor the activities, while they occur, of the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies and the Department of Defense in selecting bases for closure or realignment under the Act.

The GAO is required to provide the Commission and the Congress with a detailed analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and selection process. The GAO report, due by May 15, 1991, is also intended to describe how the DoD selection process was conducted and whether it met the requirements of the Act. In addition, the GAO is required to assist the Commission, if requested, with its review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations.

The Role of the President

The President has an important role in establishing the Commission. The President nominates the eight commissioners and designates the Chairman of the Commission.

Public Law 101-510 specifies that the President is to receive the Commission's recommended closures and realignments by July 1, 1991. The President then approves or disapproves the Commission's recommendations by July 15, 1991. If the President approves the Commission's recommendations, he reports his approval to the Congress by July 15, 1991.

If the President disapproves the Commission's recommendations, in whole or in part, he informs the Commission and the Congress of the reasons for that disapproval, again by July 15, 1991. Should the President disapprove the Commission's recommendations, the Commission must revise its list of recommendations and forward the revised list to the President by August 15, 1991.

The President then approves or disapproves the Commission's revised recommendations by September 1, 1991. If the President approves the revised recommendations, he so informs the Congress by September 1, 1991.

Should the President not approve the revised recommendations by September 1, 1991, the 1991 procedures for selecting bases to be closed or realigned under the Act would be terminated.

The Role of the Congress

The Congress of the United States plays a number of important roles regarding defense base closures and realignments. First, Congress established by Public Law 101-510 the exclusive procedures for selecting and carrying out base closures and realignments (other than minor actions under section 2687, see Appendix B). In establishing these procedures, the Congress' purpose was to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

Second, Congress asked the President in Public Law 101-510 to consult with the Congressional leadership on his nominations of individuals to serve on the Commission. In addition, the United States Senate is required to confirm those nominations.

Third, Congress maintains oversight over the base closure procedures through:

- o Authority to disapprove by law the Secretary's final criteria,
- o Receipt of the Secretary of Defense's force structure plan,
- o Receipt of the Secretary's recommended closures and realignments,
- o The role of the General Accounting Office, and
- o The requirement that the Commission's proceedings, information, and deliberations be open, on request, to designated Members of Congress.

Fourth, Congress has provided itself an opportunity to accept or reject the Commission's recommendations (through a joint resolution of disapproval) in their entirety by enactment of a law under expedited legislative procedures. Congressional disapproval of the Commission's recommendations must be accomplished through a joint resolution. The Congress established a 45-day period for its review, as computed under the law. The period begins on the date the President transmits his approval of the Commission's recommendations (Appendix A).

Finally, Congress must provide funds required to implement approved base closures and realignments.

Implementing Base Closures and Realignments

Chapter 5 contains a description of the public laws, regulations, and programs which affect implementation of approved base closures or realignments inside the United States.

Applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act

In establishing the new base closure and realignment procedures in Public Law 101-510, the Congress waived certain procedural elements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). This will streamline the environmental impact analysis process associated with closure and realignment actions.

Specifically, Public Law 101-510 waived the procedures of NEPA as it would have applied to the actions of DoD and the Commission in recommending bases for closure and realignment, and to the actions of the President in approving or disapproving the Commission's recommendations (see Appendix A).

DoD, in carrying out its responsibilities under Public Law 101-510, included environmental impact as one of the final criteria for selecting bases for closure or realignment (see Chapter 3). Consequently, while environmental impact analyses will not be accomplished under the provisions of NEPA for DoD's recommendations, the impact on the environment is a consideration in DoD's analysis.

NEPA will apply to DoD's actions in disposing of property and relocating functions to receiving bases (see Chapter 5).

Defense Management Report

DoD has been aggressively implementing the Secretary of Defense's July 1989 Defense Management Report (DMR) to the President. The DMR set forth a plan to implement the Packard Commission's recommendations, to improve the performance of the defense acquisition system, and to manage the Department and DoD's resources more effectively.

Implementation of the DMR is an integral part of DoD's overall effort to streamline and restructure the Armed Forces, as are DoD's base closure and realignment efforts under Public Law 101-510.

The underlying philosophy guiding DMR management improvements is to centralize policies, procedures, standards, and systems while decentralizing their execution and implementation. This has led to major organizational changes that are improving DoD's operational effectiveness. As a result of its implementation of the DMR, DoD is reducing the cost of doing business by cutting excess infrastructure, eliminating redundant functions, and initiating common business practices.

In general, implementing DMR actions at any one installation will fall below the thresholds established by Public Law 101-510 for reporting to the Commission. However, DoD issued guidance to the Military Departments to track DMR and other similar actions at installations subject to Public Law 101-510. The guidance required that the employment impacts of these actions be aggregated if they would have been reportable to the Commission, other than for the fact they were below the law's numerical thresholds (see Appendix D). If the cumulative employment impact exceeds the thresholds at an individual base, the guidance required that they be reported to the Commission.

Overseas Basing

Chapter 2 contains a section on the need for overseas basing. However, as the United States reduces its overseas forces, ending or

reducing operations at overseas sites has become an important part of Defense planning and budgeting.

The base closure and realignment procedures established by Public Law 101-510 for domestic bases do not apply to overseas bases.

The Secretary of Defense has the authority to end or reduce the operations of U.S. overseas forces. The Department of Defense carries out these actions in consultation with our allies and in accordance with the terms of international treaties or agreements.

The Department of Defense has established an ongoing process to announce reductions or cessations of operations overseas. To date, DoD has announced it will end or reduce its operations at almost 200 overseas sites. That represents about 12 percent of the total sites overseas where U.S. forces operate, live, and work. As the U.S. continues to drawdown its overseas forces over the next several years, substantial additional overseas closures are anticipated.

Basing overseas is often different than basing in the United States. In the United States, the areas which make up a base (operations and maintenance areas, training areas, offices, barracks, family housing areas, recreation areas, shopping areas, etc.) are often contiguous, with several properties often combined to make up a base. Overseas, each area is often distinct, separate and intermingled with local towns, farms and industrial areas. Appendix E provides a summary of DoD's worldwide base structure.

Chapter 2

Force Structure Summary

Background

Public Law 101-510 required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and to the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1992 through 1997. The Secretary submitted the plan to Congress on March 19, 1991, and to the Commission on March 23, 1991.

The force structure plan incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the FY92-97 period and takes account of the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:

- o The military threat assessment,
- o The need for overseas basing, and
- o The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. What follows is an unclassified summary of the plan.

Military Threat Assessment

For 40 years, the Soviet Union and its surrogates posed the principal threat to U.S. interests and objectives. However, America's security agenda is being rewritten because of the collapse of East European communism, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, ongoing changes within the Soviet Union, the reshaping of U.S.-Soviet relationships, and a reduction in Soviet conventional military power. This redefinition of our threat perception has been accelerated by the emergence and intensification of both new and historical regional quarrels; one of which has already brought the United States into armed conflict in the Persian Gulf. Threats to U.S. interests range from the enmity of nations like North Korea and Cuba, to pressures from friend and foe alike to reduce U.S. presence around the world.

In addition, our efforts to promote regional stability and to enhance the spread of democracy will continue to be challenged by insurgencies and terrorism.

Threats

Even with the promise of a greatly reduced Soviet force posture in Eastern Europe, certain crucial constants endure in our long-term assessment of Soviet military capability and global threats.

- o The Nuclear Threat. The most enduring concern for U.S. leadership is that the Soviet Union remains the one country in the world capable of destroying the United States with a single devastating attack. However, the rationale for such an attack is difficult to construe. Nevertheless, until and unless the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal is vastly modified, the cornerstone of U.S. military strategy must continue to be a modern, credible, flexible and survivable nuclear deterrent force.
- o The Conventional Threat. Even though Soviet military power is reducing and changing in form and purpose, the Soviet state still will have millions of well armed men in uniform and will remain the strongest military force on the Eurasian landmass. As leader of the Free World, the United States must maintain, in conjunction with our allies, the conventional capability to counterbalance the might of the Soviet Union's huge conventional forces.

Across the Atlantic

Looking eastward from our Atlantic shore, the focus of U.S. security concern has shifted from Western Europe to the defense of both Europe and the Persian Gulf. With respect to Europe, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet retrenchment within its borders, German unification, and the prospect of economic integration embody the success of collective defense, as well as the imperatives for new approaches to collective security. Although the prospect of a concerted military threat to Western Europe from the east has faded dramatically, continuing political and economic instability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union presents new concerns. Consequently,

we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners are conducting a thorough review of alliance strategy. The broad outlines of a new force posture are already emerging and include highly mobile units, some of which will be restructured into multi-national formations. The number of active units will be scaled back, and increasing reliance will be placed on mobilization and reconstitution.

Looking across the Mediterranean to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, regional threats to U.S. vital interests and enduring obligations will place continuing demands on our Armed Forces. Escort operations in the Persian Gulf, conducted for over 2 years, established the precedent of U.S. military intervention to protect the free flow of oil. Then, just as the Soviet and the Iran-Iraq war receded as threats to regional stability, Iraq emerged from 8 years of war with a fanatic zeal, a large arsenal, a shattered economy, overwhelming foreign debts, and a trumped-up quarrel with Kuwait. Even though Iraq has been ejected from Kuwait by the United Nations-sponsored and U.S. led international coalition, the region still faces an uncertain future. We will maintain our commitment and expect to significantly reduce, but not entirely eliminate, our forces in this region.

- o Immediate security concerns for many nations in Southwest Asia will be lessened because of the resounding defeat of the Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm. Over the longer term, however, a number of problems including the prospect of Iraqi rearmament, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and subsequent reconfiguration of regional security arrangements and relationships will complicate defense planning and shape strategic choices for all parties in the region.
- o While Iraq will require perhaps a decade to rebuild its military capabilities to pre-hostilities levels, Baghdad will likely remain a disruptive political force in the region. The calculus of regional security will shift as Western coalition forces draw down and political leaders are challenged to construct a more stable and predictable regional environment. The prospect of regional instability will likely remain the chief cause of concern among most

political and military decisionmakers for at least the next 2 or 3 years.

Across the Pacific

The divided Korean peninsula stands in stark contrast to the dissipating Cold War in Europe. However, the U.S. security burden is being eased by the continuing surge of democracy, economic growth, and military capacity in South Korea. Our reassessment of regional security concerns concluded that the United States could undertake a prudent phased series of steps to reduce its force presence in Korea modestly--as well as in Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific--and could initiate a gradual transition toward a partnership in which Republic of Korea armed forces assume the leading role. Should deterrence fail, however, in-place and reinforcing U.S. forces would still be required. For the region as a whole, a modest level of U.S. military presence--principally maritime-- will be essential to preserve stability, encourage democracy, and deter aggression.

The Rest of the World

This broad characterization is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in regions beyond Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Rather, the nature and urgency of threats beyond those especially compelling locales are such that the threats can be dealt with by a judicious mix of active forces adequate to protect the most vital U.S. interests and by units with specialized capabilities and mobility for crises at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The more important point is that many regional disputes are becoming increasingly lethal with the proliferation of advancing technological weapons.

The Need for Overseas Basing

In August 1990, the President, while speaking of our changing defense strategy, said: "Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more forces than we need to guard our enduring interests - the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed . . . and to . . . maintain an effective deterrent." This strategy necessitates

maintaining a balance between Continental United States (CONUS) basing and overseas basing. To provide the foundation for any national military strategy, the military must maintain facilities in CONUS for active and reserve forces for such purposes as strategic offense, tactical warning and assessment of an attack on the United States, training, research and development, mobilization, maintenance and supply, homeporting, counterdrug operations, contingency planning, and day-to-day management of the various components of the military.

Balancing the need for CONUS facilities is the continuing need for robust, though reduced, forward presence. Overseas basing remains important to the execution of peacetime forward presence and to regional contingency operations during crises. Foreign bases enhance deterrence, contribute to regional stability, and facilitate rapid response by U.S. forces in meeting threats.

In both Europe and Asia, a continuing forward-deployed presence will be maintained in sufficient strength to deter aggression and fulfill mutual security treaty obligations. However, the rapidly changing security environment has dictated changes to the overseas deployments of American forces.

Europe

These changes will be most noticeable in Europe where a dramatic reduction in U.S. forward-based forces will occur. The United States will continue to maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces, modernized where necessary, to serve as the keystone to deterrence. The continuing U.S. presence there signifies our commitment to deter aggression and is vital to regional stability in an uncertain era of shifting military balances and political relationships. Similarly, our ability to reinforce Europe in a crisis and maintain the necessary and scaled-back but ready reception and basing facilities there, becomes increasingly important as our forward presence is reduced.

Middle East and Persian Gulf

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the United States and its allies will be best served by a continued, modest military presence within the region. We have an enduring commitment to this region requiring us to restore and preserve regional stability. It has become increasingly clear that the traditional terms of American presence in the Gulf region have been forever transformed and future events in this region will shape the nature of U.S. presence.

Asia

In Asia, where potential regional aggressors have long presented a more likely threat to stability than has superpower competition, some reductions will occur. A 10 to 12 percent reduction by the end of 1992 in the 135,000 personnel currently forward-deployed in Asia is already underway. The U.S. presence at bases in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines has historically been accepted and generally welcomed as a significant contribution to regional stability. Even if the U.S. basing structure in the region experiences changes in the years to come, continuing U.S. presence and access to the region will remain important to preserve strategic interests and regional stability.

The Force Structure

Reflecting the reduced chance of global conflicts, the President's FY 1992-1993 budget (and its accompanying Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)) includes reductions in the U.S. force structure that continues a prudently phased plan for reaching the force targets established for the new strategy and threat projections. By the end of 1995, U.S. forces will approximate those targets and be well below FY 1990 levels. The FY 1995 force will also be substantially restructured so as to support the new strategy most effectively and efficiently.

Strategic forces are programmed to be scaled back in accordance with expectations regarding arms reductions agreements and to enable the Department of Defense to maintain credible strategic deterrence at the least cost. Retirement of the MINUTEMAN II force will begin in 1992. Retirements of submarines with the POSEIDON missile will be accelerated. During the 1990s, the current mix of 34 POSEIDON and TRIDENT submarines will be reduced to a force of 18

TRIDENT submarines. Air Force strategic bombers will decrease from 268 in 1990 to 181 in 1995.

Conventional forces will be restructured to include significant airlift and sealift capabilities, substantial and highly effective maritime and amphibious forces, a sophisticated array of combat aircraft, special operations forces, Marine Corps divisions, and heavy and light Army divisions.

Compared to 1990 force levels, by the end of FY 1995 the Army will have 6 fewer active divisions; the Navy will have 94 fewer battle force ships, 1 less aircraft carrier and 2 fewer carrier air wings; and, the Air Force will have 10 fewer tactical fighter wings.

Forces
(By Fiscal Year)

	FY 90	FY 93	FY 95
ARMY DIVISIONS			
Active	18	14	12
Reserve (Cadre)	10(0)	8(0)	6(2)
MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	13	13	12
CARRIER AIR WINGS			
Active	13	11	11
Reserve	2	2	2
BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	545	464	451
TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS			
Active	24	16	15
Reserve	12	12	11
STRATEGIC BOMBERS	268	171	181

DoD Personnel
(End Strength in thousands)

	FY 90	FY 93	FY 95
ACTIVE DUTY			
Army	751	618	536
Navy	583	536	510
Marine Corps	197	182	171
Air Force	539	458	437
TOTAL	2,070	1,794	1,654
RESERVES	1,128	989	906
CIVILIANS	1,073	976	940

Chapter 3

Final Criteria

Introduction

Public Law 101-510 required the Secretary of Defense to develop the final criteria to be used in selecting bases for closure and realignment. The final criteria are listed below and in Appendix C. Before developing the final criteria, the Secretary was required to publish the proposed criteria in the Federal Register and solicit public comments.

Proposed Criteria

The Department of Defense (DoD) published the proposed criteria and requested comments in the November 30, 1990, issue of the Federal Register (55 FR 49679).

The proposed criteria closely mirrored the criteria established for the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure (See Appendix F for a history of base closures).

The 1988 criteria were developed jointly by the Department of Defense and the Congress, and were incorporated, by reference, into Public Law 100-526 (the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act).

The proposed DoD selection criteria differed in two ways from the 1988 criteria. The 1988 Base Closure Commission stated that in their analysis of the DoD base structure, they gave priority to military value. The 1988 Commission also recommended that "payback" not be limited to six years. DoD agreed and changed the 1988 criteria accordingly.

Final Criteria

DoD published the final criteria in the February 15, 1991, issue of the Federal Register (56 FR 6374). The final criteria follow:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Analysis of Public Comments

DoD received 169 public comments in response to the proposed criteria and request for comments. The February 15, 1991 Federal Register notice contained an analysis of public comments received and a description of the changes DoD made to the proposed criteria. The public comments were grouped into four topics: general, military value, costs and "payback", and impacts. They are summarized below.

General Comments

A substantial number of commentors expressed concern over the proposed criteria's broad nature, and many noted a need for objective measures or factors for the criteria. The inherent mission diversity of the Military Departments made it impossible for DoD to specify detailed criteria that could be applied to all bases. However, DoD did issue policy guidance to the Military Departments requiring that measures or factors be developed for each criteria (Appendix D).

Many commentors noted that a correlation between force structure and the criteria was not present. DoD's analytical processes were based on the force structure plan. The military value criteria of the final criteria provide the connection to the force structure plan.

Many commentors noted the need for more detailed information on how DoD would implement the base closure procedures required by the Act. The DoD Policy Memoranda provided that information. These memoranda are at Appendix D.

A number of commentors recommended assigning specific weights to individual criteria. Again, the mission diversity of the Military Departments prevented DoD from adopting this recommendation.

Several commentors gave various reasons why a particular installation should be eliminated from closure or realignment evaluation. DoD could not implement this comment as Public Law 101-510 requires that all installations be evaluated equally (see Appendix A).

A number of commentors noted a need for more management controls over data collection to ensure accuracy of data. DoD agreed and issued policy guidance to the Military Departments requiring them to develop and implement internal controls (see Appendix D).

Some of the early comments received recommended extending the original December 30, 1990, public comment deadline. DoD agreed and extended the public comment period to January 24, 1991 (55 FR 53536, December 31, 1990). In addition, DoD accepted for consideration 19 public comments received after the January 24, 1991, deadline.

Comments on Military Value

A majority of comments received supported DoD's proposal to give priority consideration to military value criteria.

Several commentors recommended that National Guard and Reserve Component forces be included in the analysis. DoD agreed and the criteria were amended accordingly.

Some commentors recommended that DoD apply the military value criteria without regard to the Military Department currently operating or receiving the services of the base. DoD agreed and established procedures to pursue consolidation, sharing, or exchange of assets, where the potential exists.

Commentors recommended DoD include the availability of airspace in the consideration of military value. DoD agreed and revised the criteria accordingly.

Several commentors requested a geographic balance be maintained in closing or realigning bases. DoD could not implement this comment as Public Law 101-510 requires that all bases be evaluated equally. More importantly, DoD must retain its best assets in order to ensure that the nation obtains the best national defense for the available taxpayer dollars.

Some commentors recommended that the availability of trained civil service employees and private contractors be considered. The

availability of civilian or contractor workforces affects mission performance and consequently were already included in the criteria.

Several commentors recommended that mobilization potential at bases be considered. Contingency and mobilization requirements are important military value considerations which were already included in the criteria.

Some commentors recommended including overseas areas in the analysis. Congress specifically left overseas bases out of the procedures established by Public Law 101-510.

Comments on Cost and "Payback"

Some commentors recommended calculating total federal government costs in DoD's cost and "payback" calculations, with examples being health care and unemployment costs. DoD instructed the Military Departments to include DoD-wide costs for health care and unemployment in their cost calculations (see Appendix D).

Several commentors noted the absence of a "payback" period and suggested 8 or 10 years be specified. DoD did not agree, as we did not want to rule out making changes that would be beneficial to the national security that would have longer returns on investment. The Military Departments were directed to calculate return on investment, consider it in their deliberations, and report it in their justifications (see Appendix D).

Some commentors recommended including environmental clean-up costs in the cost calculations. DoD is required by law to address two distinctly different types of environmental actions: environmental restoration (clean-up), and environmental compliance.

- o Environmental Restoration. DoD has a legal obligation for environmental restoration at all DoD hazardous sites, regardless of a decision to close a base. Consequently, environmental restoration costs were not considered in DoD's cost calculations. However, environmental restoration problems can affect near-term community reuse of a closing base and hence land value as well. The

expected value of land at closing bases is a factor in DoD cost and savings calculations.

- o Environmental Compliance. DoD has a legal obligation to ensure existing practices are in compliance with Clean Air, Clean Water, and other environmental acts. Expected environmental compliance costs can be a factor either as an avoidance, by ceasing the existing practice through closing a base, or in determining the appropriate receiving base.
- o DoD Policy Guidance. DoD issued policy guidance on the above environmental issues (see Appendix D).

Some commentors recommended DoD issue guidelines for calculating costs and savings. DoD agreed and the guidelines are at Appendix D.

Comments on Impacts

Many commentors were concerned about social and economic impacts on communities and how they would be factored into the process. DoD issued guidance to the Military Departments to calculate economic impact by measuring the effects on direct and indirect employment in a community for each recommended closure or realignment (see Appendix D).

The meaning of proposed criterion number 7, "the community support at the receiving locations," was not clear to several commentors. DoD clarified this criterion by recognizing it referred to a community's infrastructure such as roads, water and sewer treatment plants, schools and the like.

Many commentors asked how environmental impacts would be considered. As stated above, DoD considered environmental costs, when appropriate. In addition, DoD issued guidance to the Military Departments (see Appendix D) to consider, at a minimum, the following elements when analyzing environmental consequences of a closure or realignment recommendation:

- o Threatened and endangered species
- o Wetlands
- o Historic and archeological sites
- o Pollution control
- o Hazardous materials/wastes
- o Land and airspace
- o Programmed environmental costs/cost avoidances

Finally, a number of commentors questioned the meaning of proposed criterion number 9, "The implementation processes involved." DoD decided that describing the implementation plan was not a specific criterion for decisionmaking. Consequently, DoD deleted criterion number 9 from the final criteria.

Chapter 4

Recommendations

Introduction

This chapter contains the Secretary of Defense's list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment inside the United States pursuant to Public Law 101-510 (see Appendix A).

Closing a military installation means DoD is recommending that the primary missions and functions of an installation cease to be performed at that installation, at some future date (see Appendix A for the definition of military installation). DoD's closure recommendations may contain recommended exceptions to a full closure, such as to retain a reserve center at its current site after the rest of the installation closes.

Realigning a military installation is defined in Public Law 101-510 and Section 2687, Title 10, U.S. Code (see Appendices A and B). Realignment means DoD is recommending an action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions from a military installation. Realignment do not include reductions in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes. DoD is recommending changes to some of the 1988 Base Closure Commission's recommendations. Congress expressed a desire to approve any change to the 1988 Commission's recommendations. DoD is therefore using the new base closure and realignment procedures to obtain that approval. Using the procedures of Public Law 101-510 is the best way to effect these changes as the changes are based on the force structure plan and the final criteria.

To implement Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued general policy guidance on December 10, 1990, to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Directors of the Defense Agencies and key DoD staff. In that guidance, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics

(ASD(P&L)) was authorized to issue implementing instructions and ensure consistency in the DoD base closure and realignment process.

ASD(P&L) formed a steering committee of representatives from the Military Departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and key Department of Defense staff. This steering committee developed the final base closure criteria and coordinated several implementing policy memoranda. The Military Departments, under the general guidance of ASD(P&L), each adopted implementing processes tailored to their unique missions and organizational structures.

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary to close and realign all military installations recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission, unless the President does not approve the recommendations or a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments reported to the Secretary of Defense their nominations for closure or realignment based on the force structure plan and final criteria established under Public Law 101-510.

Appendix G provides a quick reference index of all bases affected by the recommendations, and the increases or decreases in military and civilian personnel they will experience.

The Secretary's recommendations are based on the force structure plan and the final criteria described in this report. The recommendations for closure or realignment follow.

Department of the Army

Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

The Army is reducing its force structure and tailoring its base structure in light of changes in the world situation and the reduction in resources devoted to national defense. By 1995, the Army will have 12 active divisions, 6 fewer than in 1990. The end strength of the Army will decline by almost 30 percent, with the majority of that decline overseas.

In projecting future force reductions, the Army has focused on maintaining sufficient forces in the Active Component to satisfy crisis and contingency response, and forward presence requirements, and on a structure for domestically based reinforcing forces that relies primarily on the Reserve Components.

The Selection Process

The Army has performed a detailed study of its installations to determine which, based on the final criteria and the force structure plan established under Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, should be closed or realigned. In making its choices, the Army determined which bases would serve well into the next century.

The Army began its Total Army Basing Study by determining the military value of its bases, as defined by the first four and the seventh of the final criteria. After grouping its installations for comparative purposes, the Army produced a baseline from which to formulate and gauge reasonable realignment/closure alternatives. The Army categorized bases according to like missions, capabilities, and attributes, without regard to whether the base was previously considered for closure or realignment.

In determining military value, the Army evaluated bases that historically performed the same types of missions and determined their military value relative to the entire Army. Each installation within a particular category was measured against a set of uniform

attributes relative to the category's mission. Installations were judged on their relative overall value in a category, rather than by capacity for current mission needs. The Army weighed the attributes to assess a starting point in the evaluation of the base structure. The ranking alone does not produce a decision, but represents a logical basis for judging possible opportunities for closure and realignment.

Next, the Army began the process of selecting bases for realignment and closure. The Army screened installations to determine whether any should be excluded from active consideration during this process. To do this, the Army considered the force structure plan, assessments of military value, and visions of the future to identify reasonable candidates for more detailed study. Then the study focused on whether the cost of the closure or realignment package would provide a return on investment. After considering the potential impacts on the environment and local economies, recommendations were presented to senior Army leaders. As this study progressed, those alternatives considered not feasible were eliminated. The Army routinely met with the Air Force and the Navy representatives to discuss the potential for interservice asset sharing.

The Army established internal controls to ensure that data was collected and assessed in a consistent and equitable manner. Standard attributes to quantify and measure the operational efficiencies, expandability, and quality of life for a base were established. The Army Audit Agency: tracked the data used to quantify each attribute; performed random testing of data at Major Commands; verified the calculations; and evaluated the reasonableness of the procedures used.

The Secretary of the Army, with the advice of the Chief of Staff of the Army, nominated bases to the Secretary of Defense for closure and realignment based on the force structure plan and final criteria established under 'Public Law 101-510. The Secretary of Defense recommends the following Army bases for closure or realignment pursuant to Public Law 101-510:

Recommendations and Justifications

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Recommendation: Close ~~Fort~~ Benjamin Harrison, retain the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis Center. **This** proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Closure Commission; the **U.S.** Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) will now relocate from ~~Fort~~ Sheridan to **Fort Knox, KY**, rather than to Fort Benjamin Harrison. Realign the Soldier Support Center (U.S. **Army** Adjutant General and Finance Schools) from ~~Fort~~ Benjamin Harrison, IN, to Fort Jackson, SC, to initiate the Soldier Support Warfighting Center.

Justification: The **Army** is creating a "vision of the future" for the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which incorporates the need for reduced training loads ~~as~~ the force structure decreases and also recommends management initiatives that will reduce expenditures. Part ~~of~~ this TRADOC "vision" calls for the creation ~~of~~ a Soldier Support Warfighting Center which will eventually collocate the Adjutant General, Finance, Staff Judge Advocate General and Chaplain schools. The collocation of these branches enhances their synergistic effect by training ~~as~~ a team similar to the manner in which they are employed. Although force structure reductions do not dictate specific base structure changes in the training installation category, they do suggest that ~~adjustments~~ are possible through operational and management changes. ~~Fort~~ Benjamin Harrison has a small TRADOC mission. The training functions are important but require less unique, special, or extensive facilities or acreage than other training schools. Expansion external to the property line is limited and would be expensive.

Retaining the DOD Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis Center in Building 1, the second largest administrative building in the DOD inventory, will allow continued operations without engaging in costly leases or incurring moving costs at this time. Diverting the realignment of USAREC **to Fort Knox, KY**, places USAREC on an

active duty installation with its own airfield, hospital, family housing and other Army community services once ~~Fort~~ Benjamin Harrison is closed. This action can occur in a time frame consistent with the closure of Fort Sheridan. USAREC's realignment costs to Fort Knox are less than to Fort Benjamin Harrison.

Closure of ~~Fort~~ Benjamin Harrison has an immediate return on investment. Implementing this recommendation will save \$59M, including \$104M in land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$36M. One building at Fort Benjamin Harrison is on the National Register of Historic sites; additional buildings are potentially eligible. Ground water and asbestos remedial actions are required and other cleanup costs are likely. The current environmental restoration cost estimate is \$4 million. Closure may result in a potential employment change of -1% in the Indianapolis area, +2% at ~~Fort~~ Jackson, and +3% at Fort Knox. Future reuse of facilities after disposal may mitigate this impact. Reserve components require a small enclave carved out to house current USAR activities.

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Recommendation: Close Fort Chaffee, retaining the facilities and training area to support Reserve Component (RC). The permanent stationing of the current Active Component tenant, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at ~~Fort~~ Polk, LA, is outlined in another paper (~~Fort~~ Polk).

Justification: All the installations in the major training area category have similar military value, except for ~~Fort~~ Irwin, CA, which ranked first by a wide margin. Study of the installations in this category, including Fort Chaffee, was driven by the desire to reduce overall manpower and costs while increasing the training opportunities for their primary users, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

When ~~Fort~~ Chaffee was designated the temporary location of the JRTC, Army National Guard and US Army Reserve training was constrained by active component requirements for training areas and facilities. This realignment will eliminate constraints to training and better support RC units in the geographic area. While Reserve Component end strength will decline by FY 95, changes in force structure by geographic region have not been determined. In fact,

while a given area may lose force structure, other units **requiring** training in that **area** may make it **impossible** to close an installation. Further analysis of RC force structure and training requirements remains to be done. **The** transfer of Fort Chaffee to the Reserve Component, coupled with the realignment of **the 5th ID (MX)** from Fort **Polk** to **Fort** Hood and **the** permanent stationing of the JRTC at **Fort** Polk, provides a return on investment **four years** after the completion of the realignment.

Implementing this recommendation (including the transfer of JRTC **from** Fort Chaffee **to** Fort Polk, the 5th ID **(MX)** **from** **Fort** Polk to Fort Hood and the 199th SMB from Fort **Lewis** **to** Fort Polk) will cost \$256M. Annual savings after implementation are expected **to** be \$23M. The environmental impact will be positive at Fort Chaffee. Action may result in a potential **loss** of **6.1 percent of jobs** in the local community. Oil and **gas** drilling activities on the installation may mitigate that impact. **Since** training tempo will decline: in the near future, land use may be reduced. However, drilling associated with oil and **gas** leases managed **by** the Bureau of Land Management will continue.

Fort Devens, Massachusetts

Recommendation: Close Fort Devens, retaining only facilities to support Reserve Component training requirements. This proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the **1988 Base Closure** Commission that directed the relocation of HQ, Information Systems Command (ISC), and supporting elements to **Fort** Devens from Forts Huachuca, AZ, Monmouth, NJ, and Belvoir, VA, and leased space in the National Capital Region. It is more **cost effective** to leave HQ, ISC, where it is currently located. **This** recommendation would: create a small reserve enclave on **Fort Devens** main post and retain approximately 3,000 acres for use **as a** regional training center; **dispose** of **the** remainder of the post; retain HQ, Information Systems Command (ISC) and supporting elements at **Fort** Huachuca, AZ, and **Fort** Monmouth, NJ; relocate **10th Special Forces Group (SFG) (Airborne)** **from** **Fort Devens, MA**, to **Fort** Carson, CO; relocate selected ISC elements **from** Fort Belvoir, VA, to Fort Ritchie, MD, or another location within the National Capital Region. Essential facilities and training areas will be retained; excess facilities and land will be sold.

Justification: The decision to transfer **Fort Devens** to the Reserve Components ~~was~~ driven **by** the need to reduce the number of command and control installations. A review of the **Army's** requirements in this category revealed that all missions located on post or scheduled to be realigned to the post could be accommodated at other installations within the current structure with little or no effect **on** the readiness of active units. Retaining a reserve enclave and training facility ~~was~~ necessitated by the desire to maintain the readiness of the numerous ~~reserve~~ component units from the New England area that currently depend **on** the facilities at **Fort Devens** for training. The relocation of the 10th SFG has been under study by the **Army** for quite some time because of the inadequate training land available at Fort Devens.

The **Army** will need fewer command and control installations in the future. Of the **Army's** Command and Control installations, Fort Devens was ranked 9 out of 11 in military value. It is not critical to either the mid-term management of the **Army's** builddown or the long-term strategic requirements of the **Army's** command and control installation structure. The closure of Fort Devens and the transfer to the Reserve Components has an immediate return on investment upon completion.

Implementing this recommendation will save \$143M, including ~~\$112M~~ in land value- Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$55M. Environmental mitigation will be required. Asbestos abatement and other remedial actions are likely. The recommendation may result in a potential employment change of **-3.5%** in the Fort Devens area. There is great potential for reuse of facilities ~~which can be expected~~ to mitigate impact. The Reserve Components would ~~retain~~ a small enclave **on** main post and run the training area. This will incur a small annual cost for personnel and maintenance of the facilities and training area.

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Recommendation: Close Fort Dix, retaining only facilities to support Reserve Component (RC) training requirements. This recommendation, which is a change to the recommendation of the **1988** Base Closure Commission, relocates active organizations without a direct RC support mission except those which cannot be accommodated elsewhere. Essential facilities and training areas will be retained; excess facilities and land will be sold.

Justification: This proposal retains facilities and training areas essential to support ARNG and **USAR** units in the Mid-Atlantic states. However, it reduces base operations and real property maintenance costs considerably by eliminating excess facilities and relocating non-RC support tenants. While Reserve Component end strength will decline by FY 95, changes in force structure by geographic region have not been determined. In fact, while a given area may lose force structure, other units requiring training in that area may make it impossible to close an installation. Further analysis of RC force structure and training requirements remains to be done. All the installations in the major training area category have similar military value, except for Fort Irwin, CA, which ranked first by a wide margin. Study of the installations in this category, including Fort Dix, was driven by the desire to reduce overall manpower and costs while increasing the training opportunities for their primary users, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

The Fort Dix recommendation has an immediate return on investment. Implementing this recommendation will save \$116M, including \$83M in land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be **\$34M**. Overall environmental impact will be minimal, because training will continue. There is a sanitary landfill which is on the National Priority List (NPL). A Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) of the installation is ongoing. The planned waste water treatment facility will be funded in FY **94**, at the **4.6** million gallons per day rate to ensure compliance with New Jersey State clean water regulations when facilities are excessed. This proposed realignment may result in a potential loss of **0.9** percent of jobs in the community, a reduction additive to losses predicted (1.8 percent) as a result of the change to "semi-active" status under the 1988 Base Closure Commission. Future reuse of facilities after

disposal may be expected to mitigate some **of** the impact to the local economy. By relocating active tenants and excessing property and facilities no longer required for RC training, substantive reductions to operating costs can be achieved without any degradation of that training. The Air Force is interested in assuming some of the family housing units on Fort Dix; the number will be determined after a study **of** the requirement.

Fort McClellan, Alabama

Recommendation: Close Fort McClellan. Realign the **U.S.** Army Chemical and Military Police schools to Fort Leonard Wood, MO; realign the Department of Defense Polygraph School to Fort Huachuca, AZ; retain Pelham Range, the Special Operations Test Site (SOTS) and a reserve enclave; place in caretaker status, the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF). Create the Maneuver Support Warfighting Center at Fort Leonard Wood.

Justification. The Army is creating a "vision of the future" for the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) which incorporates the need for reduced training loads as the force structure decreases and also recommends intelligent management initiatives that will reduce expenditures. Part **of** this vision calls for the creation of a Maneuver Support Warfighting Center which collocates the Army Engineer, Chemical and Military Police schools. The collocation of these branches enhances the synergistic effect of chemical, military police and engineer units by training as a team similar to the manner in which they would be tactically employed. Although force structure reductions do not dictate specific base structure changes in the training installation category, they do suggest that adjustments are possible through operational and management changes. Fort McClellan is the home of the smallest Army Training Center. The skills produced there represent about **5% of** the Total Force and the respective schools can be reestablished on another installation which otherwise will be operating at less than current capacity with the smaller force. Return on investment is **2** years. Proceeds from the sale of excess land are projected but some areas will require environmental restoration prior to disposal.

Implementing this recommendation will **result** in a net **cost** of \$28M, including \$49M in land value. Annual savings after implementation

are expected to be \$26M. Fort McClellan is currently undergoing investigation to generate data necessary to score the site under the Environmental Protection Agency's Hazard Ranking System. **An** Enhanced Preliminary Assessment has been completed. Ground water and asbestos remedial actions are required and other cleanup costs are likely. Closure may result in a potential employment change of **-18%** in the Fort McClellan area, **+16%** at Fort Leonard Wood, and **+0.3%** at Fort Huachuca (economic impact for all recommended actions at Fort Huachuca is +8% employment change). Future reuse of facilities after disposal may mitigate impact. Army reserve components will require a small enclave carved out **for** use. Additionally, this proposal recommends licensing Pelham Range and carving out selected facilities for use by the Alabama Army National Guard. Under a separate 1988 Base Closure Commission action, part of the ground communications maintenance workload currently at Sacramento Army Depot (**SAAD**), **CA**, will transfer from **SAAD** to Anniston Army Depot, **AL**. Additionally, tactical missile maintenance workload will move from Anniston Army Depot, **AL**, to Letterkenny Army Depot, **PA**.

Fort Ord, California

Recommendation: Close Fort Ord and relocate 7th Infantry Division (Light) to Fort Lewis, WA.

Justification: The decision to close Fort Ord is based upon required force structure reductions by 1995 and the Army's reduced requirement to house divisions in the United States. Force structure and budget reductions require the Army to close several installations while maximizing use of those remaining installations with the highest military value. By **1995**, the Army will have **12** Active divisions. It currently has the capacity to house **13** divisions in the US. Based on force structure decisions already made, the **Army** has excess capacity to station at least one division. Fort Ord was selected for closure because it ranks relatively low among the Army's fighting bases in military value. The closure of Fort Ord and relocation of the 7th ID (L) to Fort Lewis is the best way to reduce excess capacity, maintain flexibility, and capitalize **on** the superior deployability and operational security attributes **of** Fort Lewis. Because of the downsizing of the 9th ID in FY **90** to the 199th Separate Motorized Brigade, Fort Lewis

has excess capacity and can easily absorb the 7th ID (L). The 199th Separate Motorized Brigade, will relocate to Fort Polk, **LA**.

Fort Ord requires the use of a civilian airport, since the military airfield is not fully capable of handling **C-141** aircraft. Those war fighting installations ranking below **Fort Ord** were not recommended for closure due to strategic location **or** because final disposition decisions for major units have not been made. Closing, **Fort Ord** provides an immediate return on investment. Proceeds from the sale of excess land are projected. Implementing this recommendation will save \$362M, including \$400M **in** land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$70M. Environmental impacts will be positive because air and noise pollution sources will be eliminated. The estimated socio-economic impact of the closure of **Fort Ord** is a potential loss of 17.5 percent of jobs in the local community. Future reuse of facilities after disposal may be expected to mitigate this impact. A Reserve Component enclave will be established to accommodate missions which cannot be relocated. The Navy is interested in assuming some of the family housing units on **Fort Ord**; the number will be determined after a study of the requirement.

Sacramento Army Depot, California

Recommendation: Close Sacramento Army Depot. Transfer the ground communication electronic maintenance workload from **Sacramento Army Depot, CA**, to **Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA**, **Anniston Army Depot, AL**, **Red River Army Depot, TX**, **Letterkenny Army Depot, PA**, and **Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX**. Retain 50 acres for Reserve Component (RC) **use**.

Justification: The decision to close Sacramento was driven by the need to consolidate functions in a time of decreasing resources. Based upon commodity studies done by the Services, the Defense Depot Maintenance Council ((DDMC)evaluated DoD depot capacity in **21** separate studies and concluded that the Sacramento workload could be more economically and efficiently accommodated at other depots. Sacramento Army Depot is rated **7** out of 10 in the military value matrix. The three depots rated lower than Sacramento have critical ammunition missions that would preclude closure. Sacramento Army Depot is one of two "electronic repair" depots. High labor rates are a key reason the DDMC recommended shifting workload to other

depots with idle capacity. Closure of Sacramento provides an immediate return on investment. Land value of zero was used in the analysis. The depot real estate (less 50 acres for the RC) is programmed for disposal after cleanup. Implementing this recommendation will save \$31M excluding any land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$56M.

Sacramento Army Depot is a National Priority List site. The Enhanced Preliminary Assessment is finished. Ground water and asbestos remedial actions are required and other cleanup costs are likely. Closure of the depot and redistribution of workload results in an employment change of -0.8% at Sacramento. Future reuse of Sacramento facilities after disposal may be expected to mitigate impact. Reserve components would retain 50 acres to house current **USAR** activities and to collocate activities in the region currently in leased space. Information Systems Command tenant will be relocated to Fort Lewis, WA. DLA supply activities would likely be moved to one of the facilities of Defense Depot West at Tracy or Sharpe Depots, both in California.

Aviation Systems Command Arid Troop Support Command Saint Louis, Missouri

Recommendation: Merge Aviation Systems Command arid Troop Support Command (AVSCOM/TROSCOM), St. Louis, MO, as part of the Inventory Control Point (ICP) consolidation under a Defense Management Report decision.

Justification: To improve efficiency of Army logistics, the Army's implementation of the Defense Management Report includes the consolidation of Inventory Control Points. The merging of AVSCOM and TROSCOM into one organization accomplishes part of the Defense Management Report by consolidating these organization in place. Military value in the form of management and costs efficiency was the driving factor for this recommendation. Of all the commodity oriented installations, the Price Support Center and the Saint Louis Federal Center which house the elements of AVSCOM and TROSCOM are rated 10 and 15 of 15, respectively. Neither facility will close under this recommendation. Merging AVSCOM and TROSCOM in place provides an immediate return on investment. Implementing this recommendation will save \$31M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$23M. There are no

foreseen environmental impacts as a result of this proposal. Realignment results in a potential employment change of -0.1% in the Saint Louis, MO area due to personnel reductions which will be achieved by the merger of the two organizations.

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Recommendation: Realign 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to Fort Hood, TX, from Fort Polk, LA; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from Fort Chaffee, AR, to Fort Polk; in addition, realign 199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) from Fort Lewis, WA, to Fort Polk. The transfer of Fort Chaffee, AR, to the Reserve Component is discussed in another paper (Fort Chaffee).

Justification: Realigning the 5th ID (MX) to Fort Hood allows the Army to fully utilize its finest fighting installation (Fort Hood) and to station the JRTC at the installation best suited to its requirements (Fort Polk). Fort Hood is the only installation which can house two divisions; fully utilizing the installation optimizes base operations. Fort Hood also ranks first in military value among fighting installations. Its ranges and training areas are outstanding as is its ability to support deployment. Realigning the 199th SMB operating force from Fort Lewis to Fort Polk enhances the training capability at **JRTC** as well as frees space at Fort Lewis for the 7th Infantry Division (Light). Fort Polk's military value is average relative to other similar installations; however, it has excellent permanent facilities and training areas ideally suited to light fighters.

The realignment of 5th ID (MX) and the 199th SMB, coupled with the transfer of Fort Chaffee to the Reserve Component (current temporary site of JRTC), provides a return on investment four years after the completion of the realignment. Implementing this recommendation (including the transfer of **JRTC** from Fort Chaffee to Fort Polk, the 5th ID (MX) from Fort Polk to Fort Hood and the 199th **SMB** from Fort Lewis to Fort Polk) will cost \$256M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$23M. Increases in population or in training tempo at Forts Hood and Polk could have minor adverse impact on the environment, principally in the areas of air pollution and land use. The proposed decrease in population at Fort Polk may result in a potential loss of approximately 25 percent of jobs in the area. Even with the JRTC and the 199th SMB, Fort Polk affords the Army with expansion capability in the future. Employment in the Fort Hood area will increase.

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Realign the Headquarters, Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) (including the Systems Integration and Management Activity) from Letterkenny Army Depot to Rock Island Arsenal and merge it with the Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to form the Industrial Operations Command (IOC). Relocate the Material Readiness Support Activity (MRSA) from Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot to Redstone Arsenal, AL, along with the relocation of the Logistics Control Activity (LCA) from the Presidio of San Francisco, **CA**, **to** Redstone Arsenal, AL. This proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Closure Commission, which directed MRSA to relocate from Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY, to Letterkenny Army Depot, PA. The merger of these **two** activities will form the Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA).

Losses in personnel at Letterkenny Army Depot are partially offset by a concurrent action to move the tactical missile maintenance workload from Anniston Army Depot, AL, Red River Army Depot, TX, Sacramento Army Depot, CA, Tobyhanna Army Depot, **PA**, and several Navy and Air Force industrial facilities into Letterkenny Army Depot and to realign the tactical vehicle and artillery maintenance workload from Letterkenny to Tooele, UT, and Red River Army Depots, TX, respectively.

Justification: To improve efficiency of the Army logistics, the Army's implementation of the Defense Management Report includes the consolidation of Inventory Control Points. Sixteen million dollars (\$16M) have already been programed for building a facility for MRSA and LCA at Letterkenny Army Depot to implement a the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendation. The Material Readiness Support Activity (MRSA) move to Letterkenny **was** specified by the 1988 Base Closure Commission. There are no additional costs to the changed destination of **MRSA**. Leaving **MRSA** at Letterkenny Army Depot would not be **as** operationally efficient as the proposed change.

In order **to** streamline management functions for industrial operations, DESCOM and AMCCOM are being merged into the IOC at Rock Island. Merging them at Letterkenny **was** also considered but was determined to be more costly.

Implementing this recommendation will cost \$3M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$2M. Changes in the force structure have indirect effects on industrial operations. The actual changes in workloads and required capacity will be affected by decisions on equipment policies that have not been made yet. When reviewing the military value matrix calculations, Letterkenny **Army** Depot rates 5 of 10 depot facilities. Moving DESCOM to Rock Island Arsenal provides an immediate return on investment. This action will have no effect on remedial environmental actions currently ongoing at any installation and the environmental impact the losing and gaining installations is expected to be minimal. These realignment actions may result in a potential employment change of -2.2% at Letterkenny.

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

Recommendation: Realign Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) from Rock Island Arsenal, **IL**, to Redstone Arsenal, **AL**, as part of the Inventory Control Point (ICP) consolidations under a Defense Management Report decision.

Justification: To improve efficiency of Army logistics, the Army's implementation of the Defense Management Report includes the consolidation of Inventory Control Points. Moving the armament portion of AMCCOM to Redstone Arsenal permits the Army to consolidate the missile and armament functions into one ICP. Changes in the force structure only have indirect effects on industrial operations. This recommendation is a business oriented decision to improve supply distribution efficiency.

Moving the AMCCOM Inventory Control Point to Redstone Arsenal provides an immediate return on investment. Implementing this recommendation (including the consolidation of the missile and armament functions into one ICP at Redstone Arsenal, **AL**, as well as formation of the Industrial Operations Command (IOC) at Rock Island, **IL**) will save \$2M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$66M. This action will have no effect on remedial environmental actions ongoing at any installation and the environmental impacts are expected to be minimal.

These realignment actions may result in a potential employment change of +2.6% at Redstone Arsenal and -1.1% at Rock Island Arsenal. Losses in personnel at Rock Island Arsenal are partially offset by a concurrent action to move the Headquarters, Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) from Letterkenny Army Depot, PA, to Rock Island Arsenal, merging AMCCOM and DESCOM to form the Industrial Operations Command (IOC).

Realign Army Laboratories (LAB 21 Study)

Recommendation: The LAB 21 study establishes the Combat Materiel Research Laboratory (CMRL), at Adelphi, MD. The Army also recommends that the Army Material Technology Laboratory (AMTL), Watertown, MA, not be split up and sent to Detroit Arsenal, Picatinny Arsenal and Fort Belvoir but instead that the AMTL be sent to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD, less the Structures Element that should be collocated at the NASA-Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA. This proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Closure Commission.

Justification: The decision to form the CMRL was driven by the LAB 21 Study and a Defense Management Report decision to consolidate Army laboratories to create a world class laboratory and achieve savings through a more efficient laboratory system. The military value of CMRL lies with the exploration of technology to be used in both the improvement of current of military systems and the development of future systems. The establishment of the CMRL will provide a return on investment in 3 years. Implementing this recommendation will cost \$92M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$51M. The establishment of CMRL will have minimum environmental impact. The establishment of CMRL may result in a potential employment change of +0.1% in the Adelphi, Maryland area. Specific realignments for the CMRL follow:

- o Move the Army Research Institute (ARI) MANPRINT function from Alexandria, VA, to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) MD.
- o Move the 6.1 and 6.2 materials elements from the Belvoir Research and Development Center, VA, to APG, MD.

- o Move the Army Materials Technology Laboratory (AMTL) (less Structures element) from Watertown, **MA**, to APG (Change to the recommendations of the **1988** Base Closure Commission).
- o Move the AMTL Structures element to the Army Aviation Aerostructures Directorate collocated at NASA-Langley Research Center at Hampton, **VA**, and expand the mission at that site to form an Army Structures Directorate. (Change to the recommendations of the **1988** Base Closure Commission).
- o Move the Directed Energy & Sensors Basic and Applied Research element of the Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics at Fort Belvoir, **VA**, to Adelphi, **MD**.
- o Move the Electronic Technology Device Laboratory from Fort Monmouth, **NJ**, to Adelphi, **MD**.
- o Move the Battlefield Environment Effects element of the Atmospheric Science Laboratory at White Sands Missile Range, **NM**, to Adelphi, **MD**.
- o Move Ground Vehicle Propulsion Basic and Applied Research from Warren, **MI**, to the Army Aviation Propulsion Directorate collocated at the NASA-Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, **OH**, to form the Army Propulsion Directorate.
- o Move the Harry Diamond Laboratories Woodbridge Research Facility element to CMRL, Adelphi, **MD** and close/dispose of the Woodbridge, **VA**, facility.
- o Move the Fuze Development and Production Mission (Armament related) from Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi, **MD**, to Picatinny Arsenal (ARDEC), **NJ**.
- o Move the Fuse Development and Production Mission (Missile related) from Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi, **MD**, to Redstone Arsenal (MRDEC), **AL**.

Tri-Service Project Reliance Study

Recommendation: Execute the Tri-Service Project Reliance medical research aspects of a Defense Management Report decision by reducing the number **of** Army medical research labs from 9 to **6**. This action includes disestablishing the Letterman Army Institute of Research (LAIR), Presidio of San Francisco, CA (change to the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendation); disestablishing the U.S. Army Institute of Dental Research (LJSAIDR), Washington, DC, and disestablishing **U.S.** Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory (USABRDL), Fort Detrick, MD. The proposal recommends consolidating the Army's trauma research and medical materiel development with existing Army medical Research Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) facilities. The proposal also recommends the collocation of seven Tri-Service medical research programs at existing Army, Navy and Air Force medical laboratories as follows: the Army blood research with the **Navy**; the Army combat dentistry with the Navy; Army directed energy (laser and microwave) bioeffects with the Air Force; elements of the Army and Navy biodynamics with the Air Force; Navy and Army toxicology (environmental quality and occupational health) with the Air Force; Navy infectious disease research and Air Force environmental medicine (heat physiology) with the Army.

Justification: Realigning medical research laboratories and programs achieves efficiencies through inter-department consolidations, transfers and reliance in technology. Medical research activities are relatively unaffected by changes in force structure. Military value in the form of mission requirements and the technological capabilities of existing staff expertise and facilities were the driving factors in this recommendation. Implementation of Project Reliance medical realignments results in steady state savings to the Army from elimination of civilian authorizations. This proposal changes the recommendation of the 1988 Base Closure Commission that previously identified LAIR for movement to Fort Detrick, MD. Under this proposal, **LAIR** is disestablished and the construction of a new laboratory at Fort Detrick is eliminated. Implementing the LAIR portion of this recommendation will save \$56M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$7M. Environmental and community impacts are expected to be minimal. Closure **of LAIR**, USABRDL and USAIDR and other realignments may result in potential employment impacts of **0.8%** at Fort Detrick, MD, and less than **.1%** at other installations. Specific realignments are:

- o Disestablish the Letterman Army Institute of Research (LAIR) as part of the closure of the Presidio of San Francisco, cancel the design and construction of the replacement laboratory at Fort Detrick, MD, and realign LAIRs research programs in the following manner (Change to recommendations of the 1988 Base Closure Commission):
 - Move trauma research to the **U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research**, Fort Sam Houston, TX.
 - Move blood research and collocate with the **Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI)**, Bethesda, MD.
 - Move laser bioeffects research and collocate with the **U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM)**, Brooks Air Force Base, TX.
- o Disestablish **U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory** at Fort Detrick, MD, and transfer medical materiel research to the **U.S. Army Medical Materiel and Development Activity** at Fort Detrick and collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the **Armstrong Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory (AAMRL)** at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.
- o Disestablish the **U.S. Army Institute of Dental Research**, Washington, DC, and collocate combat dentistry research with the **Naval Dental Research Institute** at Great Lakes Naval Base, IL.
- o Move microwave bioeffects research from **Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR)**, Washington, DC, and collocate with **USAFSAM**.
- o Move infectious disease research from NMRI and collocate with **WRAIR**.
- o Move biodynamics research from **U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory**, Fort Rucker, AL, and collocate with **AAMRL**.
- o **Move heat physiology research** from **USAFSAM** and collocate with **U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine (USARIEM)**, Natick, MA.

Department of the Navy



Summary of Selection Process

Introduction

By 1995, the Navy will have 12 aircraft carriers and 11 active carrier air wings which is one fewer aircraft carrier and two fewer carrier air wings than in 1990. Navy battle force ships will decline from 545 to 451 ships, a 17% reduction. The Navy will also have 73,000 fewer active duty personnel, a 13% reduction. The Marine Corps will undergo a 15% reduction in active duty personnel. These factors require a reduction in the Navy and Marine Corps base structure.

The Navy's basing structure is focused primarily on homeporting active and reserve ships and carrier air wings. The Marine Corps basing structure is focused primarily on support of the Marine Expeditionary Forces. The base structure also provides the requisite training, logistics and housing and related support. Forward deployment operations, supported by a few overseas bases, and the domestic base structure allow Navy and Marine Corps forces to respond to the full spectrum of international conflict.

The Selection Process

The Secretary of the Navy established a Base Structure Committee chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment) to ensure that a high level, comprehensive base structure review was conducted. The Committee reviewed all installations inside the United States on an equal footing, without regard to whether the installation was previously considered for closure or realignment. They also reviewed geographic complexes in order to identify key installations whose closure could warrant other closures or realignments within those complexes.

The Committee received operational input from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Internal controls and the use of existing data bases ensured data accuracy.

The Committee categorized all facilities according to function and determined which categories possessed significant excess capacity to warrant a further, detailed analysis. The Committee separated the training category into sub-areas for additional capacity analysis.

Missions, capabilities, and attributes determined categories. For example, "Naval Stations" serve as home ports for ships. "Naval Air Stations" serve as the home base for aircraft. However, some naval air stations possess waterfront property to berth ships. These bases were not considered naval stations, but their berthing capacity was taken into account in the naval station capacity analysis.

In conducting the capacity analysis, the Committee determined critical facility codes for each category of shore installation. These served as the unit of measure for determining the capacity of a base. The Committee then considered these critical factors as well as projected deployment schedules, planning criteria, data from existing data bases and unique factors relating forces to critical facilities in the capacity analysis. Some other considerations were air installation compatible use zones, airspace congestion, and explosives safety.

After validating that some categories possessed excess capacity and evaluating the military value of bases in those categories, the Committee arrived at a list of closure or realignment candidates. The Committee then evaluated the potential costs and savings, economic impact, community infrastructure and environmental impact on these candidates (and any potential receiving locations) before making its nominations to the Secretary of the Navy. The Committee also evaluated multi-service alternatives.

The Secretary of the Navy, with the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, nominated bases to the Secretary of Defense for closure or realignment based on the force structure plan and the final criteria established under Public Law 101-510. The Secretary of Defense recommends the following Navy and Marine Corps bases for closure or realignment:

Recommendations and Justifications

Chase Field Naval Air Station, Texas

Recommendation: Naval Air Station (NAS) Chase Field is recommended for closure, with retention of the capability to be operated as an outlying field (OLF) for an undetermined period of time. Air operations personnel will be retained as necessary to operate the OLF. Air training squadrons and all other tenants will be disestablished. All basic and advanced strike air training will be accomplished at NAS Kingsville, TX, and NAS Meridian, MS. Air training squadrons at those locations will be expanded to handle any increase in student throughput, especially during transition. Runway improvements will be made at NAS Kingsville to improve safety and efficiency of additional flight operations.

Justification: Projected force structure reductions of both aircraft carriers and carrier air wings will result in reductions in the Navy's annual strike pilot training rate (PTR). This equates to an excess of approximately one of the current three advanced air training installations.

In conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered for closure, on an equal basis, all three advanced air training installations along with all other air stations. Initially, using the first four DOD selection criteria, the military value of all three was evaluated. NAS Chase Field was graded lower in military value for these key reasons:

- o Chase Field has infrastructure deficiencies requiring construction--buildings and training devices are still required there to introduce new T-45 aircraft to replace aging T-2 and TA-4 aircraft.
- o Chase Field can more readily function as an OLF than NAS Kingsville, and NAS Meridian cannot so function due to distance from the other two.

- o Realignment of Chase Field is easily reversible should the world situation dictate increased force structure with a commensurate increase in strike pilot training.

The BSC concluded NAS Chase Field was the most likely candidate for closure, and then considered the other DOD selection criteria as they pertain to closure of NAS Chase Field. Specifically, closure of NAS Chase Field will eliminate over 2300 direct and indirect positions (approximately 27.4% of the employment in the area). This will slow the housing market and reduce school district population by nearly 1000 students. No significant impacts are anticipated at the receiving locations. Continued use of the Chase airfield will not change the environmental impacts on the area. Removal of personnel will, however, remove main pollution sources (less congestion and pollution). Return on investment was favorable. NAS Chase Field is not on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List. Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$48 million. The anticipated land value is \$2 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$22 million.

Davisville Construction Battalion Center, Rhode Island

Recommendation: Naval Construction Battalion Center (NCBC) Davisville is recommended for closure. Three sets of equipment and tools for Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB), and other Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stock (PWRMS) will be relocated to NCBCs Gulfport, MS, and Port Hueneme, CA.

Justification: Projected reduction of the Naval Construction Force (NCF) by two Reserve NMCBs enables reduction in the support infrastructure to balance assets with requirements.

In conformance with the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered, on an equal basis, all three NCBCs for closure or reduction. Initially, the military value of each was evaluated, using the DOD selection criteria. NCBC Davisville was graded lowest of the three on military value, for these key reasons:

- o The reduced mission of NCBC Davisville since it will no longer be designated as a throughput site for mobilizing reserve personnel.

- o The deteriorated condition of personnel support facilities at NCBC Davisville.
- o The high degree of readiness of the Reserve Naval Construction Force, as evidenced during Desert Shield/Storm. This almost eliminates pre-deployment training requirements.
- o The significant mobilization and support capability of NCBCs Port Hueneme and Gulfport, also exhibited during Desert Shield/Storm.

The BSC concluded that NCBC Davisville is a likely candidate for closure, and then considered the other DOD selection criteria. Specifically, closure of NCBC Davisville would result in the loss of 250 direct and indirect positions, which equates to 0.3% of the metropolitan statistical area. There will be an insignificant impact on local public schools. Environmental impacts at NCBCs Gulfport and Port Hueneme will be inconsequential since both installations are already engaged in similar activities, but on a much larger scale than will be transferred. NCBC Davisville is not on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$36 million. The anticipated land value is \$22 million. Annual saving after implementation is expected to be \$6 million.

Hunters Point Annex, California

Recommendation: The Hunters Point Annex of Naval Station Treasure Island is recommended for closure. The Navy will outlease the entire property with provisions for continued occupancy of space by Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP); Planning, Engineering, Repair and Alterations Detachment (PERA), and a contractor-operated test facility. This is a change to the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendation to partially close this installation.

Justification: The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered all naval stations for closure on an equal basis in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Initially, using the first four DOD selection criteria, the military value of all

Moffett Field Naval Air Station, California

Recommendation: Naval Air Station (NAS) Moffett Field is recommended for closure. Three active duty maritime patrol squadrons will be decommissioned and the remaining active duty maritime patrol squadrons will be relocated to NAS Barbers Point, HI, NAS Brunswick, ME, and NAS Jacksonville, FL. A single P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) will be sited at Jacksonville.

Justification: Projected force structure reductions in Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) enable reductions in the MPA support shore infrastructure to balance assets to requirements and eliminate excesses. Projected MPA reductions equate to approximately one air station.

In conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered for closure, on an equal basis, all four MPA installations along with all other air stations. Initially, using the first four DOD selection criteria, the military value of all four MPA installations was evaluated. NAS Moffett Field was graded low in military value for these key reasons:

- o Air operations at NAS Moffett Field are severely encroached by air traffic at San Francisco International and San Jose and Palo Alto Municipal Airports, and air accident potential zones are particularly severe to the south with multi-family residential development.
- o NAS Moffett Field operations cannot be expanded due to adjacent development. Planned multi-story construction will further encroach on operations.
- o NAS Moffett Field is located in a high cost region.

The BSC concluded that NAS Moffett Field was a likely candidate for closure, and then considered the other DOD selection criteria for NAS Moffett Field. Specifically, closure of NAS Moffett Field will result in the loss of 7000 direct and indirect positions. This equates to a 0.8% employment loss in the immediate South Peninsula/San Jose metropolitan area. Air operations are expected to be continued by other aviation businesses which may be expected to mitigate the economic impact. A 28% loss of students is anticipated in the local

eighteen stations was evaluated. Hunters Point Annex was graded lower in military value for these key reasons:

- o Significantly reduced mission capability, and adverse impact on Drydock #4 certification, as a result of future encroachment due to mandated outleasing.
- o Reduced need for Drydock #4.
- o Serious infrastructure deficiencies which degrade mission capability and have a limited prospect for correction.

The BSC concluded that Hunters Point Annex was a likely candidate for closure, with SUPSHIP, PERA and the testing facility to remain at the site under lease-back provisions. The BSC then considered the other DOD selection criteria. Specifically, closure of Hunters Point Annex will have no significant impacts on the environment and socioeconomic status of the San Francisco Bay area. This area is already under legislative direction to be leased. Hunters Point Annex is on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Costs to implement this recommendation will be minimal. The anticipated land value is \$13 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$319 thousand.

Long Beach Naval Station, California

Recommendation: Naval Station (NAVSTA) Long Beach and the supporting Naval Hospital Long Beach are recommended for closure. Ship support functions and a parcel of land will be transferred to the Naval Shipyard. Ships assigned to the Naval Station will be reassigned to other Pacific Fleet homeports.

Justification: Substantial ship reductions in the planned force structure will result in excess berthing capacity and unneeded infrastructure. Berthing can be accomplished more economically and efficiently by consolidating remaining ships at other naval stations, thereby enabling closure of some homeports. The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered all naval stations for closure on an equal basis in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and

- o The expansion and surge capability at NTC Great Lakes, and the lack of surge or expansion capability at NTC Orlando.

The BSC concluded that NTC Orlando was the most likely candidate for closure. Given the support role relationship of naval hospitals to active duty military population in a given area (i.e., hospitals are "follower" installations), if NTC Orlando were to close, Naval Hospital Orlando would also close.

The BSC then considered other DOD selection criteria as they pertain to the closure to the Orlando complex. Closure of the Orlando Naval Complex will affect over 18,400 direct and indirect positions and reduce area employment by approximately 3.2%. The reduction is expected to be temporary because of the growth potential of the area. While NTC Orlando is not an industrial polluter, removal of the operation will improve environmental quality by reducing congestion. An increase of positions and students at Great Lakes, however, will not significantly contribute to environmental problems. NTC Orlando is not on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$456 million. The anticipated land value is \$130 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$69 million.

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Pennsylvania

Recommendation: Naval Shipyard (NSY) Philadelphia is recommended for closure and preservation for emergent requirements. The propeller facility (shops and foundry), Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, (NISMF), and Naval Ship System Engineering Station (NAVSSES) will remain in active status on shipyard property.

Justification: Substantial ship reductions and changes in the planned force structure will lead to reductions in ship repair requirements and termination of the Carrier Service Life Extension Program (CV-SLEP). Closure of a NSY is necessary to balance the Navy's industrial workforce with this reduced workload.

Realignment Act of 1990. Initially, using the first four DOD selection criteria, the military value of all eighteen naval stations was evaluated. NAVSTA Long Beach was graded low in military value for these key reasons:

- o Significant facility deficiencies exist at NAVSTA Long Beach, which require construction to correct.
- o Long Beach is a high cost location.
- o Insufficient capacity to consolidate homeporting of all Southern California ships.
- o Homeport location duplicative of nearby San Diego.

The BSC concluded that NAVSTA Long Beach was a likely candidate for closure, with personnel support facilities (including family housing) and functions supporting the shipyard and ships undergoing overhaul and repair to be realigned under Naval Shipyard Long Beach.

Additionally, given the support role relationship of Naval hospitals to active duty military population in a given area (i.e., hospitals are "follower" installations), if NAVSTA Long Beach were to close, Naval Hospital Long Beach also would close.

The BSC then considered the other DOD selection criteria as they pertain to Long Beach. Specifically, closure of NAVSTA and Naval Hospital Long Beach will affect over 23,550 direct and indirect positions and 6,000 shipboard personnel. This equates to a cumulative 0.5% loss of employment in the area. In all cases, relocation of ships and NAVSTA operations will improve the environment. Since the receiving site will not be gaining more ships but rather replacing ships lost from the force structure, no negative impacts there are anticipated. NAVSTA Long Beach is not on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$109 million. The anticipated land value is \$27 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$112 million.

to Naval Training Center (NTC) Great Lakes, IL. Other tenants will transfer to other bases or remain in leased space. The regional brig will remain.

Justification: Substantial ship reductions in the planned force structure will result in excess berthing capacity and unneeded infrastructure. Berthing can be accomplished more economically and efficiently by consolidating remaining ships at other naval stations, enabling closure of some homeports.

The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered all naval stations for closure on an equal basis in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Initially, using the first four DOD selection criteria, the military value of all eighteen naval stations was evaluated. NAVSTA Philadelphia was graded lower in military value for these key reasons:

- o Significant facility deficiencies exist at NAVSTA Philadelphia, which require construction to correct.
- o Philadelphia is a high cost location.
- o Mission reduction will occur at NAVSTA Philadelphia as a result of eliminated support requirements for the Naval shipyard, which is also recommended for closure.

The BSC concluded that NAVSTA Philadelphia was a likely candidate for closure, although the brig would remain. Additionally, because of its tenant relationship to the NAVSTA and the desirability of consolidating damage control training at NTC Great Lakes, if NAVSTA Philadelphia were closed, NAVDAMCONTRACEN would also be closed and relocated to Great Lakes.

The BSC then considered the other DOD selection criteria as they pertain to Philadelphia. Specifically, closure of NAVSTA and NAVDAMCONTRACEN Philadelphia would affect over 9100 direct and indirect positions. This employment loss, together with the loss associated with closure of the shipyard, is a 2.1% employment loss. In addition to employment impacts, a resultant over-abundance of housing is anticipated with the prospect of slow home sales. Since receiving stations have adequate capacity to accept the functions

school district, which may be partly mitigated if the Air Force decides to occupy Navy housing. Termination of Navy flight operations will eliminate certain environmental concerns for the area. Return on investment was extremely favorable. NAS Moffett Field is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List, and environmental restoration is underway.

Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$106 million. The anticipated land value is \$90 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$69 million.

Orlando Naval Training Center, Florida

Recommendation: Naval Training Center (NTC) Orlando and the supporting Naval Hospital Orlando are recommended for closure. Recruit training will be absorbed by NTC Great Lakes, IL, and NTC San Diego, CA. The nuclear training function and all "A" schools will be relocated.

Justification: Future force structure reductions and substantial reductions in Navy manpower produce reductions in requirements for basic recruit and follow-on training. As a result, slightly over two Recruit Training Centers (RTCs) can accommodate future requirements, leaving an excess capacity of approximately one RTC.

The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered all training installations on an equal basis in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Initially, the military value of each training installation was evaluated using the first four DOD selection criteria. The BSC further considered the three NTCs because of excess recruit training capacity and the desirability and benefit of collocating recruit training with a Service School Command. All things considered, NTC Orlando graded lower in military value than the other two NTCs for these key reasons:

- o Desirability of retaining the NTC in San Diego because of its collocation with major fleet concentrations.
- o The very significant capital investment in complex, sophisticated and expensive training devices, systems and buildings at NTC Great Lakes.

- o No other long term mission requirement for Sand Point property (except for the regional brig).

The BSC concluded that NAVSTA Puget Sound (Sand Point) was a likely candidate for closure, although the brig and a small surrounding parcel would be retained. The BSC then considered the other DOD selection criteria. Specifically, closure of NAVSTA Puget Sound (Sand Point) would affect almost 1800 direct and indirect positions. However, taking into account additional homeporting in Everett, there is a net increase of 860 positions in the metropolitan statistical area. This employment impact is less than 0.1%. No community impacts are anticipated at either Sand Point or the receiving base. The Sand Point property is not on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$28 million. The anticipated land value is \$25 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$2 million.

Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, California

Recommendation: Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), Tustin is recommended for closure. Family housing and related personnel support facilities will be retained in support of MCAS El Toro, CA, personnel. Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16), the air station's headquarters components and related units will be transferred to a new air station to be constructed at the Marine Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, CA. Prior to relocation, MAG-16 and MAG-39 at MCAS Camp Pendleton, CA, will be combined, mixing attack, light utility, and medium and heavy lift helicopters.

Justification: Current and projected requirements necessitate restructuring aviation support to complement combined arms training with today's faster, longer range and more lethal weapon systems. In conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the Department of the Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered all domestic MCASs on an equal basis (except MCAS Yuma, AZ, which has a unique mission). Initially, military value was evaluated, using the first four DOD selection criteria. MCAS Tustin was graded lowest in military value because surrounding urban growth

transferred from NAVSTA Philadelphia, and these assets will replace force structure losses, no environmental impacts are anticipated. NAVSTA Philadelphia is not on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$53 million. The anticipated land value is \$20 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$40 million.

Sand Point (Puget Sound) Naval Station, Washington

Recommendation: Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point) is recommended for closure. A majority of the functions and activities will be relocated to Everett, WA. The regional brig and a small surrounding parcel of land will be retained. The Navy will dispose of the remainder of the property. This is a change to the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendation to partially close this installation.

Justification: The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered all naval stations for closure on an equal basis in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Initially, using the first four DOD selection criteria, the military value of all eighteen naval stations was evaluated. NAVSTA Puget Sound (Sand Point) was graded low in military value for these key reasons:

- o Previous reductions of missions and functions at Sand Point due to base realignments, culminating in loss of nearly one-half of the property from action by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.
- o Planned relocation of Commander, Naval Base Seattle, WA, who is the Navy's Pacific Northwest regional coordinator, to Submarine Base Bangor, consistent with his concurrent responsibilities as Commander, Submarine Group Nine.
- o Need to eventually move Commanding Officer, NAVSTA Puget Sound from Sand Point to Everett as construction at Everett is completed.

Justification: Projected force structure reductions in aircraft carriers, carrier air wings, and A-6 aircraft will result in excess carrier aviation support shore infrastructure. This excess capacity equates to approximately one air station. In conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered for closure, on an equal basis, all carrier aviation support installations along with all other air stations. Initially, using the first four DOD selection criteria, the military value of all carrier aviation support installations was evaluated. NAS Whidbey Island was graded low in military value for these key reasons:

- o Available capacity at NAS Lemoore, CA.
- o Single runway configuration at NAS Whidbey which limits operational flexibility and future growth.
- o Encroachment at NAS Whidbey outlying field.
- o Previous studies to relocate EA-6B squadrons to NAS Lemoore and eventually consolidate all West Coast attack squadrons at NAS Lemoore.
- o Reduction of A-6 aircraft.
- o Substantial reduction in maritime patrol aircraft which were previously which were previously planned to backfill A-6 mission reduction at NAS Whidbey Island.

The BSC concluded that NAS Whidbey Island was a likely candidate for closure. Given the support role relationship of naval hospitals to active duty military population in a given area (i.e., hospitals are "follower" installations), if NAS Whidbey Island were to close, Naval Hospital Oak Harbor also would close.

The BSC then considered other DOD selection criteria. Specifically, closure of NAS Whidbey Island and Naval Hospital Oak Harbor will precipitate the loss of over 11,700 direct and indirect positions. The cumulative effects will be a 58.3% loss of employment in the Island County area, and impacts on housing and schools. Additional facilities will be required at NAS Lemoore. The addition of almost

6000 positions at NAS Lemoore will tax housing and local school systems there. NAS Whidbey Island is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing this recommendation will cost about \$492 million. The anticipated land value is \$33 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$76 million.

Midway Island Naval Air Facility, Midway

Recommendation: Naval Air Facility Midway Island is recommended for realignment. The mission of the Naval Air Facility would be eliminated. Currently it is operated under a Base Operating Support Contract with a minimum of military personnel providing contract surveillance. Only a caretaker presence of 48 personnel would remain.

Justification: The mission of NAF Midway Island will be eliminated. Although in a strategic geographic location, current Navy operations do not require its retention.

In conformance with the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) considered for closure or reduction, on an equal basis, all Naval Air Stations (including NAF Midway Island). Initially, the military value of each was evaluated, using the DOD selection criteria. NAF Midway Island was graded lower in military value for these key reasons:

- o Reduced site-specific mission requirements of NAF Midway Island.
- o The acceptable degradation to "Pony Express" joint operations.

The BSC concluded that NAF Midway Island is a likely candidate for closure, and then considered the other DOD selection criteria. Specifically, realignment of NAF Midway Island would result in the loss of 230 contractor direct and indirect positions, which is the entire civilian population of Midway Island. Environmental impacts at NAF Midway Island would be inconsequential since operations there will cease and there is no relocation. NAF Midway Island is not on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List. Implementing this recommendation will cost virtually nothing. The anticipated land value is \$38 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$6.0 million.

Naval Air Warfare Center

Recommendation: As an integral part of the Navy's RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Consolidation Plan, six realignments and one closure, as described in the accompanying table, are recommended in connection with establishment of the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC).

Justification: Consolidation of the Navy's RDT&E, engineering and Fleet support activities is driven by Congressionally mandated reductions in the Navy's overall budget and acquisition workforce. These activities will be consolidated along mission and functional lines in four centers. The missions of the activities will be purified, so that each activity will be assigned unique technology leadership areas. All work tasked in these leadership areas will be performed only at the cognizant activity. The purification process will lead to development of critical mass technical capability in each area.

With headquarters in Washington, DC, NAWC will be the Navy's full spectrum center for air platforms and air warfare combat and weapons systems. NAWC will be organized into two major divisions:

- o **Aircraft Division:** centered at Patuxent River, MD; primarily responsible for aircraft, engines, avionics and aircraft support; with activities located at Indianapolis, IN, and Lakehurst, NJ, and facilities at Trenton, NJ.
- o **Weapons Division:** centered at China Lake, CA, and Pt. Mugu, CA; primarily responsible for aircraft weapons and weapons systems, simulators and targets; and with a facility at White Sands, NM.

In development and review of the plan, all RDT&E facilities were considered on an equal basis, in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) validated the plan using the DOD selection criteria. For example, and most notably, Naval Air Development Center (NADC), Warminster, graded lower in military value, for these key reasons:

- o NADC has no facilities that cannot be replicated elsewhere.

- o Other activities are uniquely tied to their location.
- o NADC has a constrained airspace over densely populated areas, which is not suitable for flight testing high performance aircraft.
- o NADC has limited land for expansion to accommodate consolidation.

The BSC noted that almost 3300 eliminated positions at eight installations were directly attributable to site-specific workload reductions, rather than streamlining or consolidation. The BSC also considered the other DOD selection criteria. The economic and environmental issues associated with each site were evaluated. Exclusive of site-specific workload reductions, establishment of NAWC will result in elimination of approximately 910 positions and transfer of approximately 2020 positions. Details related to each site are summarized in the table below. Of the sites in question, NADC Warminster and Lakehurst are on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing these recommendations will cost about \$226 million. The anticipated land value is \$27 million. Annual savings after implementation is expected to be \$62 million.

Table of Recommendations to Establish Naval Air Warfare Center

A. Realignments and Closures:

1. **Naval Air Development Center (NADC), Warminster, PA,** will be disestablished as a separate technical command and Aircraft Division. The bulk of its functions will be transferred to Patuxent River, MD. Custody of, and personnel to sustain, unique navigation facilities will transfer to Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center. The airfield will close. Military family housing will be retained. A total of approximately 2250 positions will be either transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.

2. **Naval Air Propulsion Center (NAPC), Trenton, NJ**, will be disestablished as a separate technical command and realigned to merge with the Aircraft Division. Engineering personnel will be transferred to Patuxent River. High altitude engine testing will be transferred to the U.S. Air Force. Unique engine test cells will be maintained and operated at the site. A total of approximately 360 positions will be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
3. **Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC), Lakehurst, NJ**, will be disestablished as a separate technical command and realigned to merge with the Aircraft Division. The Naval Air Engineering Station will be established to maintain the operating site. A total of approximately 460 positions will be eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
4. **Naval Avionics Center (NAC), Indianapolis, IN**, will be disestablished as a separate technical command and realigned to merge with the Aircraft Division. Naval Avionics Station, Indianapolis, will be established to maintain the operating site. A total of approximately 630 positions will be eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
5. **Naval Weapons Center (NWC), China Lake, CA**, will be disestablished as a separate technical command, realigned under Weapons Division. A net total of approximately 1110 positions will be either transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
6. **Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC), Pt. Mugu, CA**, will be disestablished as a separate technical command and realigned to merge with the Weapons Division. A net total of 820 positions will be eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
7. **Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility (NWEF), Albuquerque, NM**, will transfer functions to the Weapons Division and close. A total of approximately 110 positions will be transferred or eliminated.

B. Others:

Although not falling into the categories of closure or realignment, the following installations are integral to the overall plan and success of the NAWC consolidation.

1. **Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, MD**, will be disestablished as a separate technical command and realigned to merge with the Aircraft Division. A net total of approximately 1300 positions will be gained at NATC Patuxent due to streamlining, net transfer and specific workload reductions.
2. **Naval Ordnance Missile Test Station (NOMTS), White Sands, NM**, will be downsized approximately 14 positions due to specific workload reductions, and realigned to operate as a facility of the Weapons Division.

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center

Recommendation: As an integral part of the Navy's RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Consolidation Plan, seven closures and one realignment, as described in the accompanying table, are recommended in connection with establishment of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC).

Justification: Consolidation of the Navy's RDT&E, engineering and Fleet support activities is driven by Congressionally mandated reductions in the Navy's overall budget and acquisition workforce. These activities will be consolidated along mission and functional lines in four centers. The missions of the activities will be purified, so that each activity will be assigned unique technology leadership areas. All work tasked in these leadership areas will be performed only at the cognizant activity. The purification process will lead to development of critical mass technical capability in each area.

With headquarters in Washington, DC, NCCOSC will be the Navy's full spectrum center for maritime command, control and communications and intelligence (C3I), ocean surveillance technology, and fleet and shore support. NCCOSC will be organized in three major divisions:

- o **RDT&E Directorate:** primarily responsible for the development of C3I systems, ocean surveillance systems and navigation support; located at San Diego, with facilities in Warminster, PA.
- o **West Coast In-Service Engineering (ISE) Directorate:** primarily responsible for shipboard satellite communications, navigation and Pacific ISE support; collocated with the RDT&E Directorate at San Diego, with an operating site at Pearl Harbor.
- o **East Coast ISE Directorate:** primarily responsible for shore communications, air traffic control and Atlantic ISE support; solely located at Portsmouth, VA.

In development and review of the Plan, all RDT&E facilities were considered on an equal basis, in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) validated the plan using the first four DOD selection criteria. For example, several activities were graded higher in military value, for these key reasons:

- o Availability of land and facilities to accommodate consolidation.
- o Proximity to Fleet concentrations.
- o Greater difficulty to relocate larger rather than smaller activities. The BSC noted that approximately 790 eliminated positions at three installations were directly attributable to site-specific workload reductions, rather than streamlining or consolidation. The BSC also considered the other DOD selection criteria. The economic and environmental issues associated with each site were evaluated. Exclusive of site-specific workload reductions, establishment of NCCOSC will result in elimination of approximately 46 positions and transfer of approximately 2310 positions. Details related to each site are summarized in the table. None of the sites in question is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing the recommendations will cost about \$64 million. Annually, the recommendations will save about \$13 million.

**Table of Recommendations to Establish
the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center**

A. Realignments and Closures:

- 1. Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC), Vallejo, CA, will transfer its functions to the West Coast ISE Directorate at San Diego, CA, and close. A total of approximately 310 positions will be transferred.**
- 2. Naval Space Systems Activity (NSSA), Los Angeles, CA, will transfer all of its functions to the RDT&E Directorate at San Diego, and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in Washington, DC, and close. A total of approximately 30 positions will be transferred.**
- 3. Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC) Detachment, Kaneohe, HI, will transfer the bulk of its functions to the RDT&E Directorate at San Diego, and remaining functions to the West Coast ISE Directorate operating site at Pearl Harbor, and close. A total of approximately 190 positions will be transferred.**
- 4. Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC), Charleston, SC, will transfer its functions to the East Coast ISE Directorate at Portsmouth, VA, and close. A total of approximately 360 positions will be transferred.**
- 5. Naval Electronic Systems Security Engineering Center (NESSEC), Washington, DC, will transfer its functions to the East Coast ISE Directorate at Portsmouth, VA and close. A total of approximately 160 positions will be transferred.**
- 6. Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Activity (NESEA), St. Inigoes, MD, will transfer its functions to the East Coast ISE Directorate at Portsmouth, VA and close. The property will be transferred to the Naval Air Warfare Center. A total of approximately 330 positions will be transferred.**
- 7. Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC), San Diego, CA, will transfer its functions to the West Coast ISE Directorate also in San Diego, and close. A total of approximately 620 positions will be either transferred or eliminated due to consolidation reductions.**

B. Others:

Although not falling into the categories of closure or realignment, the following installations are integral to the overall plan and success of NAWP consolidation.

- 1. Naval Ocean System Center (NOSC), San Diego, CA,** will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the RDT&E Directorate, to be the center for both the RDT&E Directorate and the West Coast ISE Directorate. Functions will be gained from NESEC, Vallejo NESEC San Diego, FCDSSA San Diego, NSSA Los Angeles and NOSC DET Kaneohe. Functions will be transferred to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Newport, RI, and to the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Dahlgren, VA. Positions will be gained and lost through transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net gain of approximately 560 positions.
- 2. Naval Electronics Engineering Activity, Pacific, Pearl Harbor, HI,** will be disestablished as a separate command and organizationally realigned with the West Coast ISE Directorate. It will gain functions from NOSC DET Kaneohe and remain a major operating site. Positions will be gained through transfers and eliminated due to specific workload reductions for a net loss of approximately 15 positions.
- 3. Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NESEC), Portsmouth, VA,** will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the East Coast ISE Directorate to be the center for the directorate. Functions will be gained from NESEC Charleston, NESEA St. Inigoes, and NESSEC Washington, DC. Positions will be gained through transfers and eliminated due to specific workload reductions for a net gain of approximately 570 positions.

Naval Surface Warfare Center

Recommendation: As an integral part of the Navy's RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Consolidation Plan, six realignments and two closures, as described in the accompanying table, are recommended in connection with establishment of the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC).

Justification: Consolidation of the Navy's RDT&E, engineering and Fleet support activities is driven by Congressionally mandated reductions in the Navy's overall budget and acquisition workforce. These activities will be consolidated along mission and functional lines in four centers. The missions of the activities will be purified, so that each activity will be assigned unique technology leadership areas. All work tasked in these leadership areas will be performed only at the cognizant activity. The purification process will lead to development of critical mass technical capability in each area.

With headquarters in Washington, DC, NAWC will be the Navy's full spectrum center for surface platforms and surface warfare combat and weapons systems. It is also the focal point for all ship and submarine hull, mechanical and electrical programs. NSWC will be organized in four major divisions:

- o **Combat and Weapons Systems R&D Division:** primarily responsible for surface combat, and weapons systems, mine and amphibious warfare, and mine countermeasures; centered at Dahlgren, VA, with an operating site in Panama City, FL, and facilities at White Oak, MD.
- o **Combat and Weapon System In-Service Engineering (ISE) Division:** primarily responsible for in-service engineering to surface ships and mines, underway replenishment and combat systems software; centered at Port Hueneme, CA, with an operating site in Dam Neck, VA.
- o **Combat and Weapon System Engineering and Industrial Base Division:** primarily responsible for gun systems, ordnance and explosives; centered at Crane, IN, with operating sites at Louisville, KY, and Indian Head, MD.

- o **Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E), R&D, and ISE**
Divisions: primarily responsible for ship and submarine HM&E and propulsion; centered at Carderock, MD, with an operating site at Philadelphia, and facilities at Annapolis, MD.

In development and review of the Plan, all RDT&E facilities were considered on an equal basis, in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) validated the plan using the first four DOD selection criteria. For example, and most notably, both the David Taylor Research Center (DTRC) Annapolis Laboratory Detachment and the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) detachment White Oak, graded lower in military value for these key reasons:

- o Ample space to expand to accommodate consolidation (Annapolis constrained and only 730 acres at White Oak vs 43,000 acres at Dahlgren).
- o Lack of availability or proximity to suitable overwater test ranges (none at White Oak).
- o Duplicative engineering capability to that existing elsewhere (Annapolis vs Naval Ship System Engineering Station Philadelphia).
- o Availability to operate on a reduced basis due to proximity to a larger laboratory (Annapolis and Carderock; White Oak and Dahlgren).

The BSC noted that approximately 3980 eliminated positions at eleven installations were directly attributable to site-specific workload reduction, rather than streamlining or consolidation. The BSC also considered the other DOD selection criteria. The economic and environmental issues associated with each site were evaluated. Exclusive of site-specific workload reductions, establishment of NSWC will result in elimination of approximately 600 positions and transfer of approximately 2100 positions. Details related to each site are summarized in the table below. None of the sites in question is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

Implementing the recommendations will cost about \$181 million. Annually, the recommendations will save about \$29 million.

Table of Recommendations to Establish the Naval Surface Warfare Center

A. Realignments and Closures:

1. **Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility (ICSTF), San Diego, CA,** will transfer its functions to the Combat and Weapon System In-service Engineering (ISE) Division at Port Hueneme, CA, and close. A total of approximately 46 positions will be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation.
2. **Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity (NMWEA), Yorktown, VA,** will transfer its functions to the Combat and Weapon Systems ISE Division at Dam Neck, VA, and close. A total of approximately 230 positions will either be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
3. **Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Detachment White Oak, MD,** will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned. The bulk of its functions will be transferred to the Combat and Weapon Systems R&D Division at Dahlgren, VA. Custody of and the personnel to sustain unique facilities will be retained. A total of approximately 1255 positions will either be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
4. **Naval Coastal Systems Center (NCSC) Panama City, FL,** will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Combat and Weapon Systems R&D Division as a major operating site at Panama City, FL. There will be a minor transfer of functions to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Newport, RI, and to the Combat and Weapon Systems R&D Division at Dahlgren, VA. A total of approximately 285 positions will either be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation.
5. **David Taylor Research Center (DTRC), Annapolis Laboratory, MD,** will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) R&D and ISE Division. The majority of its functions will be transferred to the HM&E R&D and ISE Division at Philadelphia and to DTRC, Carderock, MD. Unique facilities and the personnel to sustain them will be retained. A total of approximately 655 positions will either be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.

6. **Naval Ordnance Station (NOS) Indian Head, MD**, will be disestablished as a separate command and organizationally realigned with the Combat and Weapon Systems Engineering and Industrial Base Division at Crane, IN. It will remain as a major operating site. A total of approximately 610 positions will be eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
7. **Naval Ordnance Station (NOS) Louisville, KY**, will be disestablished as a separate command and organizationally realigned with the Combat and Weapon Systems Engineering and Industrial Base Division at Crane, IN. It will remain as a major operating site. Positions will be gained and lost through transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net loss of approximately 600 positions.
8. **Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned with the Combat and Weapon Systems Engineering and Industrial Base Division at Crane, IN, as the center for the division. Positions will be gained and lost through transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net loss of approximately 1065 positions.

B: Others:

Although not falling into the categories of closure or realignment, the following installations are integral to the overall plan and success of the NAWC consolidation.

1. **Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support Activity, (FCDSSA), Dam Neck, VA**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Combat and Weapon Systems ISE Division at Dam Neck, VA. Functions will be gained from NMWEA Yorktown and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center. Positions will be gained from transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net gain of approximately 350 positions.
2. **Naval Ship Weapons Systems Engineering Station (NSWSES), Port Hueneme, CA**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Combat and Weapon Systems ISE Division at Port Hueneme, CA, as the center for the division. Positions will be gained from transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net loss of approximately 25 positions.

3. **Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Dahlgren, VA**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Combat and Weapon Systems R&D Division at Dahlgren, VA, as the center for the division. Positions will be gained from transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net gain of approximately 480 positions.
4. **Naval Ship Systems Engineering Station (NAVSSES) Philadelphia, PA**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HM&E) R&D and ISE Division as a major operating site at Philadelphia, PA. There will be a minor gain of functions from DTRC, Annapolis, MD. Positions will be gained from transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net loss of approximately 255 positions.
5. **David Taylor Research Center (DTRC), Carderock, MD**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the HM&E R&D and ISE Division at Carderock, MD, as the center for the division. There will be a gain of functions from DTRC, Annapolis, MD. Positions will be gained from transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions for a net gain of approximately 105 positions.

Naval Undersea Warfare Center

Recommendation: As an integral part of the Navy's RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Consolidation Plan, four realignments, as described in the accompanying table, are recommended in connection with establishment of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC).

Justification: Consolidation of the Navy's RDT&E, engineering and Fleet support activities is driven by Congressionally mandated reductions in the Navy's overall budget and acquisition workforce. These activities will be consolidated along mission and functional lines in four centers. The missions of the activities will be purified, so that each activity will be assigned unique technology leadership areas. All work tasked in these leadership areas will be performed only at the cognizant activity. The purification process will lead to development of critical mass technical capability in each area.

With headquarters in Washington, DC, NUWC will be the Navy's full spectrum center for submarine sensors and submarine combat and weapons systems. NUWC will be organized into two major divisions:

- o **Combat and Weapons Systems Divisions:** primarily responsible for submarine combat and weapon systems and combat systems in-service engineering (ISE); and centered at Newport, RI, with an operating site at Norfolk, and facilities at New London, CT.
- o **Weapons Systems ISE Divisions:** primarily responsible for ISE and depoing of weapons, targets, counter measures and non-expendable equipment, and management of Pacific ranges; and centered at Keyport, WA.

In development and review of the plan, all RDT&E facilities were considered on an equal basis, in conformance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. The Navy's Base Structure Committee (BSC) validated the plan using the first four DOD selection criteria. For example, and most notably, Naval Underwater Systems Center (NUSC) Detachment, New London, CT.

- o Very limited land for expansion to accommodate consolidation (189 acres at Newport vs 28 acres at New London).
- o Approximately 1.2 million square feet of space at Newport, over one-third of which has been constructed in the last 15 years, vs approximately 740,000 square feet of space in New London.
- o Avoid \$12.6 million construction project at New London.

The BSC noted that approximately 1410 eliminated positions at five installations were directly attributable to site-specific workload reduction, rather than streamlining or consolidation. The BSC also considered the other DOD selection criteria. The economic and environmental issues associated with each site were evaluated. Exclusive of site-specific workload reductions, establishment of NUWC will result in elimination of approximately 250 positions and transfer of approximately 1080 positions. Details related to each site are summarized in the table below. None of the sites in question is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List. Implementing the recommendations will cost about \$71 million. Annually, the recommendations will save about \$11 million.

Table of Recommendations to Establish the Naval Undersea Warfare Center

A. Realignments:

1. **Naval Underwater Systems Center (NUSC) Detachment New London, CT**, will be disestablished as a separate command. The bulk of its functions will be transferred to the Combat and Weapon Systems Division (CWSD), Newport, RI. Personnel involved with unique facilities will remain and be realigned under CWSD Newport. A total of approximately 1070 positions will either be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
2. **Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering Station (NSCSES) Norfolk, VA**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with CWSD as a major operating site at Norfolk. There will be a transfer of functions to the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Dam Neck and Norfolk. A total of approximately 530 positions will either be transferred or eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
3. **Trident Command and Control Systems Maintenance Activity, (TRICCSMA), Newport, RI**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Combat and Weapon Systems Division at Newport, RI. A total of approximately 40 positions will be eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.
4. **Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station (NUWES), Keyport, WA**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the Weapon Systems ISE Division at Keyport, WA, as the center for the division. A total of approximately 700 positions will be eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.

B. Other:

Although not falling into the categories of closure or realignment, the following installation is integral to the overall plan and success of the NUWC consolidation.

1. **Naval Underwater Systems Center (NUSC), Newport, RI**, will be disestablished as a separate command and realigned to merge with the CWSD Newport, as the center for the division. Functions will be

gained from NUSC Det New London, the Naval Surface Warfare Center, and the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center. A net total of approximately 1120 positions will be gained from transfers and eliminated due to consolidation and specific workload reductions.

Department of the Air Force





Summary Selection Process

Introduction

The Air Force will reduce its active component force structure by 29% across the Future Years Defense Program. This reduction spans the spectrum of Air Force active missions and includes a commensurate reduction in manpower. The resulting smaller force necessitates a reduction in Air Force base structure, both overseas and stateside. In determining base structure needs, the Air Force focused on both the Active and Air Reserve Component to ensure a Total Force approach to the process.

The Selection Process

The Air Force used a structured process that treated all bases equally, without regard to past studies or announcements. The basis for selection was the Force Structure Plan and the eight final criteria established under Public Law 101-510.

The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group of five general officers and five SES-level career civilians with expertise across a wide range of disciplines. This Group reviewed all bases with more than 300 civilians authorized. Major Command and reserve component representatives served as advisors to the group. Data was collected directly from the bases and validated by the Major Commands, Air Staff and Air Force Audit Agency.

The Executive Group placed all bases in categories and conducted a capacity analysis based on the Force Structure Plan. Categories and subcategories having no significant excess capacity were excluded from further study. These categories and subcategories were flying/mobility, flying/other, and the support category including depots, and product divisions/laboratories and test facilities. All remaining bases were evaluated on the basis of military requirements. As a result, certain bases having unique missions not affected by the Force Structure Plan, in geographic locations where a base was

required, or otherwise militarily needed were excluded from further study.

All Active Component bases not excluded were individually examined on the basis of the eight final criteria, and on approximately 80 sub-elements. The sub-elements were developed by the Air Force to provide specific data points for each criterion. They vary somewhat by category. Each sub-element for each base was individually coded and the Group agreed to an overall coding for each criterion.

For the tactical subcategory five options were developed, with six developed for the strategic subcategory. Each option assigned bases to three groups, in order of desirability for retention. The basic scoring employed all eight final criteria, with priority to the first four. Other options were developed by applying all eight criteria, but rescored all bases in the category with added weight placed on specified factors.

The Air Reserve Component Category required a slightly different approach. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Component bases do not readily compete against each other. Air Reserve Component units enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. Further, the recruiting needs of these units must be considered. The Executive Group first identified those realignments which would achieve reasonable savings. Then, the final criteria were applied to assure that the realignment would be cost effective, consistent with military requirements, and otherwise sound.

Intercommand and interservice utilization analysis was also accomplished. The Directors of Plans and Programs from the Major Commands met on several occasions with the Executive Group. Also, consultations with Army and Navy base closure representatives occurred regarding potential interservice asset sharing.

The Secretary of the Air Force, with the advice of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and in consultation with the Base Closure Executive Group, nominated bases to the Secretary of Defense for closure and realignment based on the force structure plan and the final criteria established under Public Law 101-510. The Secretary of Defense recommends the following Air Force bases for closure or realignment:

Recommendations and Justifications

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas

Recommendation: Bergstrom AFB, Texas, is recommended for closure. All active RF-4s will be retired. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing will inactivate. The corrosion control facility will remain if it continues to be economical to operate there. The Air Force Reserve units will remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civil airport. If no decision on a civil airport is reached by June of 1993, the units will be redistributed as directed by the Secretary of the Air Force. If units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be redistributed. The Twelfth Air Force Headquarters; 12th TAC Intelligence Squadron; and the 602nd Tactical Air Control Center Squadron will relocate to Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The 712th Air Support Operations Center Squadron will relocate to Fort Hood, Texas. All other personnel will depart. The 41st Electronic Combat Squadron (ECS) (EC-130H aircraft) will remain in place at Davis-Monthan AFB rather than move to Bergstrom AFB as recommended by the 1988 Base Closure Commission.

Justification: The Air Force has five more tactical bases than needed to support the number of fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All tactical bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Bergstrom AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All tactical bases are in generally good condition with

strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Bergstrom AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other fifteen bases in the tactical subcategory and is recommended for closure. While Bergstrom AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. The overall long term military value of Bergstrom AFB suffered because of local/regional encroachment and a lack of suitable ranges/airspace. Additionally, the cost to close Bergstrom AFB is low and the savings are high.

The closure of Bergstrom AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 17,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of just over 10,600 jobs, and regional income loss of 175 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of nearly 600,000, available jobs of just over 388,000, and regional annual income approaching 9 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$121M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$36.3M.

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Recommendation: Carswell AFB, Texas, is recommended for closure. The 7th Bombardment Wing will inactivate. The B-52H aircraft will transfer to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. The KC-135 aircraft will transfer to the Air Reserve Component (ARC). The 301st Tactical Fighter Wing (AFRES), 73rd Aerial Port Squadron (AFRES), 457th Tactical Fighter Squadron (AFRES) and the 20th Medical Services Squadron (AFRES) will remain at Carswell AFB in an efficient cantonment area containing only the direct support facilities. The 436th Strategic Training Squadron (SAC) will relocate to Dyess AFB, Texas. All other active duty personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has six more strategic bases than are needed to support the number of bombers and tankers in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All strategic bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and

Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Carswell AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All strategic bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Carswell AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other twenty bases in the strategic subcategory and is recommended for closure. While Carswell AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. The long term military value of Carswell AFB is impacted by severe local and regional encroachment. Carswell AFB also ranked below average in wartime tanker utility. The cost to close Carswell AFB is relatively low.

The closure of Carswell AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 20,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of just over 12,000 jobs, and regional income loss of nearly 212 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of over 1,200,000, available jobs just over 600,000, and regional annual income of 17 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$156M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$45.5M.

Castle Air Force Base, California

Recommendation: Castle AFB, California, is recommended for closure. The 93rd Bombardment Wing will inactivate. The bomber and tanker Combat Crew Training missions will transfer to Fairchild AFB, Washington. The B-52G conventional aircraft will transfer to KI Sawyer AFB, Michigan. The KC-135 aircraft will transfer to the Air Reserve Component and other active units. All other active duty personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has six more strategic bases than are needed to support the number of bombers and tankers in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All strategic bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Castle AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All strategic bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Castle AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other twenty bases in the strategic subcategory, and is recommended for closure. While Castle AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. Peacetime and wartime tanker utility negatively impact the long term military value of Castle AFB. Also, encroachment on the base and flight patterns is significant. The condition of the facilities at Castle AFB is below average in the Strategic subcategory, and the housing deficit is much greater than average. Additionally, the cost to close Castle AFB is relatively low and the savings are favorable.

The closure of Castle AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 16,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of nearly 9,000 jobs, and regional income loss approaching 162 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of just over 492,000, available jobs close to 216,000, and regional annual income of 6.5 billion dollars. Castle AFB is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$63M. This savings could be increased by approximately \$27M in land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$52.7M.

Eaker Air Force Base, Arkansas

Recommendation: Eaker AFB, Arkansas, is recommended for closure. The 97th Bombardment Wing will inactivate. The B-52G Air Launched Cruise Missile aircraft will retire. The KC-135 aircraft will transfer to other KC-135 units. All other active duty personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has six more strategic bases than are needed to support the number of bombers and tankers in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All strategic bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Eaker AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All strategic bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria

and Air Force subelements. Eaker AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other twenty bases in the strategic subcategory, and is recommended for closure. While Eaker AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. The long term military value of Eaker AFB ranked below average because of both peacetime and wartime tanker utility and access to bombing ranges. Also, the cost to close Eaker AFB is very low and the savings are very high.

The closure of Eaker AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 9,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of nearly 4,600 jobs, and regional income loss of just over 83 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of over 202,000, available jobs close to 99,000, and regional annual income of 2.2 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$221M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$52.9M.

England Air Force Base, Louisiana

Recommendation: England AFB, Louisiana, is recommended for closure. The 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing will inactivate. Assigned aircraft will be retired or redistributed among remaining active and reserve component units. One active A/OA-10 squadron will be realigned to Eglin AFB, Florida and one to McChord AFB, Washington. All other personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has five more tactical bases than needed to support the number of fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All tactical bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close England

AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All tactical bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. England AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other fifteen bases in the tactical subcategory and is recommended for closure. While England AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. The long term military value of England AFB is limited by weather and available airspace for training. England AFB has the least suitable weather of all bases ranked within this category. Although its location relative to Fort Polk is an asset, adequate Air Force support can be provided from Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Additionally, the cost to close England AFB is low and the savings are very high.

The closure of England AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 10,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of just over 5,700 jobs, and regional income loss of nearly 97 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of 139,600, available jobs just over 60,000, and regional annual income of 1.5 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$176M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$47.2M.

Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana

Recommendation: Grissom AFB, Indiana, is recommended for closure. The 305th Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. The KC-135 aircraft will transfer to the Air Reserve Component (ARC). The EC-135 aircraft will retire. The 434th Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), the 930th Tactical Fighter Group (AFRES), and the 930rd Civil Engineering Squadron (AFRES) will remain. The 930th Tactical Fighter Group will convert to the KC-135 and that unit's A-10s will retire. The Air Force Reserve units will be grouped in an efficient

cantonment area containing only the essential direct supporting facilities. The Air Force Reserve will operate the airfield unless the local/state authorities decide to convert to a civil airport. The airfield and all operational facilities will be retained and those facilities not required by the Reserves will be mothballed for future contingencies. However, the airfield and these facilities would be made available as required to support joint civil use. All family housing and community support facilities including the hospital, base exchange, commissary and all morale and welfare facilities not authorized for Reserve units will be declared excess and made available for disposal. All other active duty personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has six more strategic bases than are needed to support the number of bombers and tankers in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All strategic bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Grissom AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All strategic bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Grissom AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other twenty bases in the strategic subcategory, and is recommended for closure. While Grissom AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. As an active base, Grissom AFB ranked lower in long term military value because of peacetime and wartime tanker utility as well as access to bombing ranges. Additionally, the cost to close Grissom AFB Base is low and the savings are substantial. The condition of the existing facilities at Grissom AFB is ranked well below the average.

The closure of Grissom AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 9,700 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of just over 5,200 jobs, and regional income loss of nearly 88 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of just over 197,000, available jobs close to 101,000, and regional annual income of 2.6 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$157M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$48.3M.

Loring Air Force Base, Maine

Recommendation: Loring AFB, Maine, is recommended for closure. The 42nd Bombardment Wing will inactivate. The B-52G conventional aircraft will transfer to KI Sawyer AFB, Michigan. The KC-135 aircraft will realign to the Air Reserve Component (ARC) and other active units. All remaining personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has six more strategic bases than are needed to support the number of bombers and tankers in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All strategic bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Loring AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All strategic bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Loring AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other twenty bases in the strategic subcategory, and

is recommended for closure. While Loring AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. Loring AFB ranked lower in long term military value due to limited peacetime tanker utility and access to bombing ranges. The condition of the existing facilities at Loring AFB is well below average. The cost to close Loring AFB is low and the savings are the highest of the bases considered in this subcategory.

The closure of Loring AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 22,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of nearly 9,900 jobs, and regional income loss of just over 92 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of over 49,100 available jobs close to 33,320 and regional annual income of 755 million dollars. Loring AFB is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$182M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$61.8M.

Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado

Recommendation: Lowry AFB, Colorado, is recommended for closure. The Lowry Technical Training Center will inactivate. Courses currently conducted at Lowry AFB will be consolidated at remaining Technical Training Centers, contracted, or relocated to other locations. The 1001st Space Systems Squadron, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and Air Force Reserve Personnel Center will remain at Lowry AFB in cantonment areas. No housing (unaccompanied and family), community support, recreation, or other base support facilities will be retained. Major tenant units relocating are: 3320th Correctional Squadron to Lackland AFB, Texas; and the U.S. Army instructor and support cadre to Keesler AFB, Mississippi. All other personnel will depart. Courses from Chanute AFB, Illinois, realigned to Lowry by the 1988 Base Closure Commission will, instead, realign to various other locations.

Justification: The Air Force has one more Technical Training Center base than needed to support reduced Air Force enlisted accessions (30,000 per year). All Technical Training Center bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. The selection process involved the evaluation of a large number of subelements of the criteria by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Lowry AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All Technical Training Center bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Lowry AFB ranked low and is recommended for closure. While Lowry AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. Lowry AFB's facilities ranked below the category average. The lack of a runway limited this base's overall long term military value and its ability to accept additional missions across a broad spectrum. Although not part of the cost analysis, Lowry AFB has one of the highest potentials to return substantial proceeds from property disposal to the Base Closure Account. Finally, the closure of Lowry AFB would reduce excess capacity with favorable savings.

The closure of Lowry AFB will have an impact on the local economy, although it is relatively the least severe of any of the Technical Training Center bases. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 9,500 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of nearly 12,000 jobs, and regional income loss of nearly 295 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of nearly 1,600,000, available jobs of nearly 1,000,000, and regional annual income of approximately 28 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net cost of implementing this recommendation is about \$48M. This cost could be reduced by approximately \$100M in land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$42M.

Moody Air Force Base, Georgia

Recommendation: Moody AFB, Georgia, is recommended for closure. The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing will inactivate. Assigned aircraft will be redistributed to modernize other active and reserve component units. All other personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has five more tactical bases than needed to support the number of fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All tactical bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Moody AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All tactical bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Moody AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other fifteen bases in the tactical subcategory and is recommended for closure. While Moody AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. The long term military value of Moody AFB, when compared to the other bases in its category, suffered because of weather, and its location in a region where special use airspace is being stressed increasingly by a growth in air traffic. Additionally, it is the least costly base to close of all bases in this subcategory.

The closure of Moody AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 9,300 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of just over 4,800 jobs, and regional income loss of nearly 98 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of 106,000, available jobs of just over 54,000, and regional annual income of just over 1.2 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$143M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$45.1M.

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina

Recommendation: Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina, is recommended for closure. The 354th Tactical Fighter Wing will inactivate. Assigned aircraft will be retired or redistributed among remaining active and reserve component units. One active A/OA-10 squadron will be realigned to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, and one to Pope AFB, North Carolina. All other personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has five more tactical bases than needed to support the number of fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All tactical bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Myrtle Beach AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All tactical bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Myrtle Beach AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other 15 bases in the tactical subcategory

and is recommended for closure. While Myrtle Beach AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. Incompatible development within the clear zone and accident potential zone, as well as local and regional airspace encroachment, and weather all negatively impact the long term military value of Myrtle Beach AFB. Additionally, the cost to close Myrtle Beach AFB is low and the savings are high.

The closure of Myrtle Beach AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 20,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of nearly 10,000 jobs, and regional income loss of just over 97 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of just over 183,000, available jobs approaching 100,000, and regional annual income of just over 2.1 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$76M. This savings could be increased by approximately \$15M in land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$30.2M.

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, Missouri

Recommendation: Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, Missouri, is recommended for closure. The 442nd TFW, consisting of A-10 aircraft and associated support units will realign to Whiteman AFB, Missouri. Remaining major tenant units consist of the 36th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 77th Aerial Port Squadron, and the 78th Aerial Port Squadron which realign to Peterson AFB, Colorado. All remaining Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard personnel will depart.

Justification: Analysis of the DoD Force Structure Plan does not reveal a significant reduction in Air Reserve Component force structure. However, realignments of Air Reserve Component (ARC) units onto active bases could, potentially, be cost effective. Therefore, the Air Force decided to continue examination of the ARC category for cost effective realignments to other bases. The evaluation of the Air Reserve Component category recognized that ARC bases do not readily compete against each other. Air Reserve Component units

enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. Further, consideration must be given to the recruiting needs of these units. A Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians, was appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The BCEG first identified those realignments which could achieve reasonable savings. Then, the eight DoD selection criteria were considered to assure that the realignment would be cost effective, consistent with military requirements, and otherwise sound. The recommendation to close Richards-Gebaur ARS was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

For many years, the Air Force Reserve has borne a substantial portion of the operating costs of this airfield even though it is operated by the Kansas City Department of Aviation and Transportation. When the joint use arrangement was initiated in the late 1970's, the Air Force anticipated that an economically viable civil airport would develop and cost to the Air Force would be reduced dramatically over time. That has not occurred; therefore, relocation of the Air Force Reserve activities to an active Air Force base would achieve significant cost savings. Attention was focused on nearby Whiteman AFB, Missouri since the 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing could be relocated within the same recruiting area and, thus, avoid substantial loss of assigned personnel. The long term operational impact to this unit is minimal since Whiteman AFB has similar access to training ranges, low level routes, and Army exercise areas.

Realignment of the 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing to Whiteman AFB can be accomplished at low cost and the return on investment will be less than five years.

The closure of Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of 4,600 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of 2,600 jobs, and regional income loss of 26.9 million dollars. The losses are in contrast to a regional population of over 702,200, available jobs of 461,000, and regional annual income approaching 11 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net cost of implementing this recommendation is about \$4M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$12.9M.

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio

Recommendation: Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio is recommended for closure. The 160th Air Refueling Group (ANG) will move to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio with 20 KC-135 aircraft. The 121st Tactical Fighter Wing will inactivate. The 907th Tactical Airlift Group (AFRES) will become the 907th Military Airlift Group and relocate with ten C-141 aircraft to Wright-Patterson AFB. The remaining six C-141 aircraft currently projected for this unit will be assigned to the 445th Military Airlift Wing (AFRES) at March AFB, California. The 4950th Test Wing, currently located at Wright-Patterson AFB, will move to Edwards AFB, California. Remaining major tenant units consist of the Naval Air Reserve Center and Army Aviation Facility. Both may move to locations as determined by those Services or may remain in cantonment at this location and the Air Force will transfer the necessary property to the Army and Navy as required. All remaining Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard personnel will depart.

Justification: Analysis of the DoD Force Structure Plan does not reveal a significant reduction in Air Reserve Component force structure. However, realignments of Air Reserve Component (ARC) units onto active bases could, potentially, be cost effective. Therefore, the Air Force decided to continue examination of the ARC category for cost effective realignments to other bases. The evaluation of the Air Reserve Component category recognized that ARC bases do not readily compete against each other. Air Reserve Component units enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. Further, consideration must be given to the recruiting needs of these units. A Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians, was appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The BCEG first identified those realignments which could achieve reasonable savings. Then, the eight DoD selection criteria were considered to assure that the realignment would be cost effective, consistent with military requirements, and otherwise sound. The recommendation to close Rickenbacker AGB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

Since the reserve units at Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio are the predominate users of the airfield, the support costs for these activities

are high. Therefore, it was apparent the relocation to an active base could achieve significant cost savings. Thus, attention was focused on Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio in order to keep the Guard unit in the State of Ohio. Also, because of the relative short distance (70 miles) between Columbus and Dayton, Ohio, it was considered likely that most of the personnel currently in these units would remain in a move to Wright-Patterson AFB. In addition, this would move those units closer to the centroid of a very large demographic area which would enhance recruiting potential. This resulted in the recommended realignments. The cost to realign the 160th Air Refueling Group and the 907th Tactical Airlift Group to Wright-Patterson AFB is low since the facilities to be vacated by the 4950th Test Wing are designed for aircraft similar to the 20 KC-135 and ten C-141 aircraft which will be used by the Air Force Reserves and Ohio Air Guard. Although the Air Force Reserve unit was scheduled to receive 16 C-141 aircraft, the number was reduced to ten in order to avoid costly MILCON of parking ramps and hangars that would be required to accommodate all the aircraft. The remaining six C-141 aircraft will be assigned to the Air Force Reserve unit at March AFB, California. The realignment of the 4950th Test Wing and its consolidation with the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, California will result in a more economical and efficient operation and the cost of transfer is moderate. The return on investment will be less than five years. In addition to the substantial recurring cost savings, this realignment enhances the total force concept through a closer association of active and reserve forces.

The closure of Rickenbacker Air Guard Base will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of 13,100 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of 6,700 jobs, and regional income loss of 41 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of over 1,071,000, available jobs of 677,000, and regional annual income of 15.5 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net cost of implementing this recommendation is about \$16M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$22.7M.

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona

Recommendation: Williams AFB, Arizona, is recommended for closure. All aircraft will be retired or redistributed. The 82nd Flying Training Wing will inactivate. Major tenant unit relocating is: Aircrew Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida. All other personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has one more Training subcategory base than needed to support reduced Air Force force structure. All Training subcategory bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. The selection process involved the evaluation of a large number of subelements of the criteria by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Williams AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All Training subcategory bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Williams AFB ranked low in this process and is recommended for closure. While Williams AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. Williams AFB ranked lowest in its category for airspace encroachment both now and in the future, directly impacting its long term military value. Additionally, it ranked lowest in condition of base facilities. The cost to close Williams AFB is low and savings are favorable.

The closure of Williams AFB will have an impact on the local economy; however, it is the least severe of any of the Training subcategory bases. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 7,700 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of

nearly 6,000 jobs, and regional income loss of nearly 130 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of just over 2,000,000, available jobs of nearly 1,200,000, and regional annual income of nearly 33 billion dollars. Williams AFB is on the Environmental Protection Agency's National Priorities List.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$222M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$54.1M.

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan

Recommendation: Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, is recommended for closure. The 379th Bombardment Wing will inactivate. The B-52G Air Launched Cruise Missile aircraft will retire. The KC-135 aircraft will relocate and transfer to the Air Reserve Component (ARC). All other personnel will depart.

Justification: The Air Force has six more strategic bases than are needed to support the number of bombers and tankers in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All strategic bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to close Wurtsmith AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All strategic bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and Air Force subelements. Wurtsmith AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other twenty bases in the strategic subcategory, and is recommended for closure. While Wurtsmith AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight

DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. The long term overall military value of Wurtsmith AFB is below average because of distance to low altitude training routes, and poor peacetime tanker utility. The cost to close Wurtsmith AFB is very low and the savings very high.

The closure of Wurtsmith AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 9,400 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of just over 4,600 jobs, and regional income loss of nearly 94 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of 87,600, available jobs close to 34,800, and regional annual income of 987 million dollars. By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$256M. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$63.3M.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Recommendation: MacDill AFB, Florida, is recommended for realignment and partial closure. Realign the 56th Tactical Training Wing's F-16s from MacDill AFB, to Luke AFB, Arizona. The Joint Communications Support Element will move to Charleston AFB, South Carolina. The airfield at MacDill AFB will close, those facilities that support flying operations will be disposed of and the remainder of MacDill AFB will become an administrative base.

Justification: The Air Force has five more tactical bases than needed to support the number of fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. All tactical bases were considered for closure equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance. Each base was evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the eight criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG), a group of five general officers and five senior civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The recommendation to partially close MacDill AFB was made by the Secretary of the Air Force with advice of the Air Force Chief of Staff and in consultation with the BCEG.

As with the other categories, it was difficult to select closure candidates. All tactical bases are in generally good condition with strong community support. Distinctions can be drawn, however, when the data are evaluated against the criteria. MacDill AFB ranked low in this process compared to the other fifteen bases in the tactical subcategory and is recommended for realignment and partial closure. While MacDill AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, rather than one or two specific deficiencies, a few points stand out. With the planned F-16 aircraft reductions, there is no longer a requirement to maintain two F-16 training locations (MacDill and Luke AFBs) and Luke AFB will have excess capacity due to redistribution of F-15 and F-16 aircraft. The long term military value of MacDill AFB is low due to significant impacts of current/potential local and regional land use and airspace encroachment. This realignment is low cost and the savings are substantial. Although not part of the cost analysis, MacDill AFB has one of the highest potentials to return substantial proceeds from property disposal to the Base Closure Account. By consolidating F-16 training at one base, the Air Force will save a minimum of \$20 million annually.

The closure of MacDill AFB will have an impact on the local economy. It is projected to result in a population loss of approximately 6,000 persons, direct and indirect employment loss of 4,500 jobs, and regional income loss of 96 million dollars. These losses are in contrast to a regional population of just over 1.6 million, available jobs of just over 915,000, and regional annual income of nearly 26 billion dollars.

By the end of FY 97, the net savings from implementing this recommendation are about \$53M. This savings could be increased by approximately \$50M in land value. Annual savings after implementation are expected to be \$20.4M.

Beale Air Force Base, California

Recommendation: Instead of sending the 323rd Flying Training Wing (FTW) and Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT) to Beale AFB, California, as recommended by the 1988 Base Closure Commission as part of the closure of Mather AFB, California, realign these activities to Randolph AFB, Texas.

Justification: The Air Force has identified six Strategic Air Command bases for closure under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Beale AFB was identified as a location for realigning force structure from these closing bases. The excess capacity identified by the 1988 Commission at Beale can better be utilized by operational strategic force structure instead of navigator training.

Also, based on the DoD Force Structure Plan, the requirements for Undergraduate Navigator Training have reduced substantially from the level projected at the time of the 1988 Commission. As a result, Randolph AFB has the capacity to absorb the 323rd FTW at reduced cost while maintaining a quality training environment. The MILCON avoidance totals approximately \$31.5M.

Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas

Recommendation: As part of the closure of Chanute AFB, Illinois, realign the fuels training to Sheppard AFB, Texas, and realign the technical training fire course to Goodfellow unless a satisfactory and cost effective contract can be arranged. The 1988 Base Closure Commission recommended that both of these courses be realigned to Goodfellow AFB, Texas.

Justification: The Air Force would like the opportunity to explore more cost effective ways to conduct fire training. However, realignment to Goodfellow AFB would proceed if a satisfactory and cost effective alternative cannot be arranged.

Based upon the DoD Force Structure Plan and the base structure review, the Air Force identified excess dormitory/dining hall capacity at Sheppard AFB that can accommodate the fuels training courses. Moving fuels training to Sheppard AFB, taking advantage of excess facilities, will result in MILCON cost avoidance of approximately \$2.6M.

March Air Force Base, California

Recommendation: As a part of the closure of Norton AFB, California, realign 45 Headquarters Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA) manpower authorizations (out of 184 total positions) to the National Capital Region (NCR). The remaining 139 HQ AFAA positions remain at March AFB, as recommended by the Commission. The 1988 Base Closure Commission recommended that the AFAA realign to March AFB, California.

Justification: On February 4, 1991, a restructuring of HQ USAF was announced. In that restructuring, the Auditor General position, along with six other AFAA positions were transferred to the manpower rolls of the Air Force Secretariat. This action formally recognized that the Auditor General would be both a member of the Secretariat and the manager of the AFAA. It is imperative that, in his dual role, the Auditor General have sufficient staff in the NCR to establish Air Force policy and direct AFAA operations.

Mather Air Force Base, California

Recommendation: As part of the closure of Mather AFB, California, realign the 940th Air Refueling Group (ARG) (Air Force Reserve) to McClellan AFB, California, and leave the 323rd FTW Hospital open as an annex to McClellan AFB. The 1988 Base Closure Commission recommended realignment of the 940th ARG (AFRES) to McClellan AFB if local authorities did not elect to operate the Mather facility as an airport.

Justification: During the Air Force review of the DoD Force Structure Plan and its base structure, sufficient capacity at McClellan AFB, which is only ten miles from Mather AFB, was identified to support the 940th Air Refueling Group (AFRES). This move to McClellan AFB will enhance operational capability because of the active duty infrastructure to support the unit and will save annual base operating costs of \$9M. In addition, the move could enhance the viable reuse of Mather AFB by the local community since this refueling unit occupies the primary flightline space at the air base. Also, the Sacramento community has not, to date, committed to the reuse of Mather AFB as a civil airport. Finally, the Commission did not specifically address where, or if, the 323rd FTW hospital would

realign. The Air Force implementation plan associated with the 1988 Base Closure Commission closes the hospital at Mather and converts a clinic to a hospital at McClellan AFB at a cost of approximately \$34M. After review, it is appropriate to keep this 45 bed hospital at Mather AFB open as an annex to McClellan AFB. This will save construction costs of expanding the existing medical facility at McClellan AFB and be responsive to all medical requirements in the Sacramento area. The MILCON avoidance is approximately \$9.5M.

Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho

Recommendation: As a part of the closure of George AFB, California, realign some F-4Gs to the Idaho and Nevada Air National Guard squadrons at Boise and Reno respectively; inactivate the 35th TTW; keep the 41st ECS (EC-130H aircraft) in place at Davis-Monthan AFB; realign Mountain Home AFB EF-111 aircraft to Cannon AFB, New Mexico; and establish a composite wing at Mountain Home AFB. The 1988 Base Closure Commission recommended that the 35th Tactical Training Wing (TTW) and the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) (F-4E/G aircraft) realign to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. These aircraft were to be consolidated with the Mountain Home AFB's EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft. To accommodate the move of the F-4E/Gs into Mountain Home AFB, the Commission recommended realigning part of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-111E and F-111A aircraft) from Mountain Home AFB to Cannon AFB, New Mexico. Additionally, the Commission recommended realigning the 27th Tactical Air Support Squadron (OV-10 aircraft) to Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona where other OV-10 aircraft were already located. To accommodate the additional OV-10 aircraft at Davis-Monthan AFB, the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron (ECS) (EC-130H aircraft) would realign from Davis-Monthan AFB to Bergstrom AFB, Texas.

Justification: The force structure upon which the 1988 Base Closure Commission based its realignment recommendations is significantly different than the current and projected force structure in the DoD Force Structure Plan. The Air Force, in its FY92 budget, programmed for the retirement of all F-4E/G aircraft assigned to George AFB. However, as a result of Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force has validated an operational requirement to maintain some total force F-4G capability into the future. The Reno and Boise units present a cost effective solution since they currently fly the RF-4 and are well located to support Red Flag operations and the Mountain Home AFB composite wing. The George AFB OV-10s have retired, therefore eliminating the need to realign the 41st ECS. Additionally, Bergstrom AFB is now recommended for closure. Realigning Mountain Home AFB EF-111s to Cannon AFB will collocate all CONUS based F-111 type aircraft at a single base, enhancing logistics support. These actions created capacity at Mountain Home AFB to support a new composite wing equipped with a variety of fighter, tanker, and potentially, bomber aircraft realigning from other bases. The MILCON avoidance is approximately \$10.6M.

Chapter 5

Implementation

Introduction

Public Law 101-510, besides establishing the procedures for selecting bases to be closed or realigned, establishes procedures for carrying out approved closures and realignments. The law also describes the applicability of other public laws and Federal regulations to the implementation of base closures and realignments (see Appendix A).

Requirement to Close and Realign Bases

The Secretary of Defense must close and realign all military installations recommended for closure and realignment by the Commission, unless the President does not approve the recommendations or a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted.

The Secretary must initiate all the closures and realignments within two years and complete all the closures within six years, beginning on the date the President approves the recommendations.

Implementation Procedures and Funding

The Secretary may (in implementing the approved base closures and realignments) acquire land, construct replacement facilities, and plan and design for relocating activities.

Public Law 101-510 establishes a special Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990, to fund costs associated with closing and realigning bases. The Secretary may also use the Account to provide: economic adjustment assistance to communities; community planning assistance; and, outplacement assistance to civilian employees.

The Secretary may use the Account to provide for environmental restoration and mitigation at closing and realigning bases. The

Secretary is required to ensure that environmental restoration of property made excess as a result of closing or realigning bases be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purposes.

Property Disposal

The Administrator of General Services is required to delegate to the Secretary of Defense the Administrator's property disposal authorities under public law to: utilize excess property; dispose of surplus property; grant approvals and make determinations; and, make excess or surplus property available for wildlife conservation purposes. The Secretary is required to follow General Services Administration regulations in carrying out his property disposal authorities under public law.

Before the Secretary can dispose of any surplus real property or facility, he is required to consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of local governments about the local community's plans for the use of the property. For almost 30 years, DoD has helped local communities plan for the reuse of closing bases. This program, managed by DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment, is discussed later in this chapter.

The Secretary may transfer real property or facilities at a closing or realigning base to a Military Department or the Coast Guard, with or without reimbursement. This authority is important to help ensure DoD retains its best assets in cases where the transfer from one Department to another could not be identified during the base closure and realignment selection process.

Applicability of the National Environmental Policy Act

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) will apply to the actions DoD takes in implementing approved base closures and realignments. NEPA will apply in disposing of property and in relocating functions from a base being closed or realigned to a receiving base. However, in applying NEPA to property disposal or relocating functions, DoD need not consider: (1) the need for closing or realigning the base; (2) the need for transferring functions to a base selected as a receiving base; or (3) alternatives to the closing, realigning or receiving bases.

Congressional Oversight

DoD is required to report annually to the defense committees of Congress the following information concerning implementation of approved base closures and realignments:

- o A schedule of closure and realignment actions for the year,
- o The costs required and savings to be achieved,
- o An assessment of the environmental effects of the actions,
- o A description of actions at receiving bases, and
- o An assessment of the environmental effects at the receiving bases.

Finally, DoD is required to report to the Congress the funds remaining in the Base Closure Account after the Account has terminated. Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after termination will be held in the Account until transferred by law.

Easing the Impact

Closing military bases is difficult, especially for the communities affected. DoD has for years managed programs designed to assist communities, homeowners and employees in adjusting to the closure of bases.

Economic Adjustment Assistance

Economic adjustment assistance for communities can alleviate local impacts of Defense program changes. Impacts may result from major base closure or realignment actions that reduce local employment. Other actions may increase Defense activity and place new demands on communities for increased public services (sewer, water, roads, schools, etc.). Changes can impact on individuals and have secondary effects on area businesses, local governments, and other elements of the local economy.

The Department takes the lead in efforts to alleviate these problems. An Economic Adjustment Program was initiated for this purpose in May 1961. Since 1970, adjustment assistance has been rendered through the President's Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) which is composed of 18 Federal departments and agencies, and chaired by the Secretary of Defense. The DoD Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) serves as the permanent staff for the Committee.

The EAC works with local, state and federal agency representatives to develop strategies and coordinate action plans to generate new job opportunities and to alleviate social and economic impacts resulting from Defense program changes. Whenever possible, former military bases are converted for productive civilian uses, i.e. airports, industrial parks, schools, hospitals, recreational areas, etc. Available federal, state and local government resources are utilized to spur private sector investments and jobs. To assist communities, the Secretary of Defense can make grants to qualified local government entities for development of community adjustment plans.

The Office of Economic Adjustment has recently completed a survey of the economic progress of nearly 100 communities affected by base closures during the past 29 years. The survey measured job replacement generation and reuses for the former bases, as accomplished and reported by the communities themselves. The survey findings were conservative since they excluded secondary and off-base jobs. The survey found:

- o New jobs replace DoD civilian losses. A total of 158,000 civilian jobs are now located on former defense facilities to replace the loss of 93,000 former DoD civilian and contractor jobs,
- o New educational opportunities. A number of four-year colleges and post-secondary vocational technical (vo-tech) institutes or community colleges, as well as high school vo-tech programs have been established at former bases. The reuse of the former Defense facilities for new vocational technical education has provided a strong job-inducement contribution to future community economic development programs,

- o Student enrollments. There are 73,000 college and post-secondary students; 20,000 secondary vo-tech students; and 62,000 trainees now receiving education and training at 57 former Defense bases, and
- o Industrial and aviation uses. Office industrial parks or plants have been established at 75 of the former Defense bases. Forty-two of the former bases are being used as municipal or general aviation airports.

The transition period (often 3-5 years) in securing new civilian uses can be difficult for many communities. Yet, the experience of communities affected by earlier base closures clearly indicates communities can successfully adjust.

More recently, OEA has been working with 21 communities which are near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 Base Closure Commission (see Appendix F). OEA has provided \$1.6 million in grants to these affected communities to help develop local reuse plans, and is working through the EAC to help these communities implement their reuse plans. Until the property at the closing bases is officially turned over for public and private use, base reuse and economic development is understandably limited. However, the Department of Defense is committed to working with communities throughout the entire process.

Environmental Restoration at Closing Bases

DoD is obligated under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) to restore contaminated sites on military bases.

DoD is committed to restoring closing bases to safe condition within the capabilities of technology and the availability of funds. The Base Closure Account, described earlier in this Chapter, can be used to fund this environmental restoration.

DoD also has several initiatives underway to expedite the environmental restoration process and thereby speed local economic recovery.

- o Environmental Response Task Force. DoD is forming an environmental response task force to report on ways to: improve interagency coordination of environmental response actions; streamline and consolidate regulations, practices and policies; and, improve environmental restoration at closing bases.
- o Model Program. DoD has established a model program which will test: expediting clean-up; accelerating the contracting process; alternatives for avoiding disputes; concurrent regulatory review; and, options for local reuse while clean-up is in progress.
- o Ongoing efforts. DoD is reemphasizing ongoing efforts including expanded use of: Interagency Agreements which specify details for restorations at National Priority List (NPL) sites; and, Memoranda of Agreement between DoD and States for resolving technical disputes at NPL sites.

Homeowners Assistance Program

The Homeowners Assistance Program has been in operation since 1966 to assist DoD military and civilian employees who are forced to move as a result of a base closure.

The Government helps eligible employees who cannot sell their homes within a reasonable time by either: buying their homes for 75 percent of their pre-closure announcement value; or reimbursing them for most lost equity should the homeowners sell the house for less than the pre-closure announcement value. The program also provides relief for displaced employees facing foreclosure.

The program is initially funded with appropriated funds; however, the fund is replenished with the proceeds from the sale or rental of houses purchased by the Government under the program.

Civilian Employee Assistance

The DoD Priority Placement Program is another program that was originally established to help DoD civilian employees adjust to the base closures of the 1960s.

A state-of-the-art automated referral system is currently in operation. Over the years since its inception, the referral system has helped more than 98,000 employees find new assignments. This system supports the Priority Placement Program and is cost effective. Periodic surveys have shown that 99 percent of placements are considered successful by the supervisors with whom the employees have been placed. Over two-thirds of the employees placed through the system have maintained their grades and salaries, or have advanced. Nearly the same number of placements have been within the commuting area of the original jobs. When that is not possible, relocation expenses are paid when an employee is placed in a job outside the present commuting area. The program has successfully placed nearly every employee willing to relocate.

The Department recognizes that placements may become increasingly difficult, and is working with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in promoting timely registration of our civilian employees in the Interagency Placement Assistance Program (IPAP) and the Displaced Employee Program (DEP). The IPAP helps place employees who are facing separation from their government positions, before the reduction-in-force starts. The DEP provides for priority placement referral of separated employees to other Federal agencies. In addition, DoD and OPM have also initiated a project to link data systems. Upon completion, the linked systems will support a significantly expanded Defense Referral System.

Appendix A

Public Law 101-510

104 STAT. 1808

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

TITLE XXIX—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

Defense Base
Closure and
Realignment Act
of 1990.
10 USC 2687
note.

10 USC 2687
note.

President.

Public
information.

PART A—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This part may be cited as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990”.

(b) **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established an independent commission to be known as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission”.

(b) **DUTIES.**—The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this part.

(c) **APPOINTMENT.**—(1)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advise and consent of the Senate.

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to the Commission—

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress;

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress.

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, the President should consult with—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members;

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members;

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one member; and

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member.

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall designate one such individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission.

(d) **TERMS.**—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was appointed to the Commission.

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.

(e) **MEETINGS.**—(1) The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public.

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon request, to the following:

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members.

(f) VACANCIES.—A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual's predecessor was appointed.

(g) PAY AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.—(1) Each member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(h) DIRECTOR OF STAFF.—(1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment.

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(i) STAFF.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel.

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule.

(3) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense.

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Commission.

(j) OTHER AUTHORITY.—(1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent funds are available.

(k) **FUNDING.**—(1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second session of the 101st Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year 1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(l) **TERMINATION.**—The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995.

SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(a) **FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN.**—(1) As part of the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period.

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such plan—

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of each such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and type of units in the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) during and at the end of each such period; and

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure plan.

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the Commission.

(b) **SELECTION CRITERIA.**—(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. The Secretary shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence.

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991.

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense committees in final form by no later than February 15 of the year concerned. Such amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15 of the year concerned.

(c) **DOD RECOMMENDATIONS.**—(1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, April 15, 1993, and April 15, 1995, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned.

Federal Register, publication.

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1), a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each recommendation.

(3) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department.

(4) The Secretary shall make available to the Commission and the Comptroller General of the United States all information used by the Department in making its recommendations to the Commission for closures and realignments.

(d) **REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION.**—(1) After receiving the recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations.

Public information.

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the President a report containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on a review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations inside the United States.

Reports.

(B) In making its recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.

(3) The Commission shall explain and justify in its report submitted to the President pursuant to paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the Commission that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c). The Commission shall transmit a copy of such report to the congressional defense committees on the same date on which it transmits its recommendations to the President under paragraph (2).

(4) After July 1 of each year in which the Commission transmits recommendations to the President under this subsection, the Commission shall promptly provide, upon request, to any Member of Congress information used by the Commission in making its recommendations.

Reports.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(A) assist the Commission, to the extent requested, in the Commission's review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c); and

(B) by no later than May 15 of each year in which the Secretary makes such recommendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process.

(e) **REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT.**—(1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President's approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.

Reports.

(2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and the Congress the reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations.

(4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall—

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e);

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in each such report;

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than two years after the date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments.

(b) **CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL.**—(1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of—

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits such report; or

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such report is transmitted.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of a period.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this part, the Secretary may—

(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance;

(B) provide—

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation,

Community
action programs.

if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance;

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at any such installation, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for environmental restoration and mitigation; Environmental protection.

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense and available for such purpose.

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the Department of Defense as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purpose. Environmental protection.

(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.—(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under this part—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484);

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)); and

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 U.S.C. 667b).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the utilization of excess property and the disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard.

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installa-

tion to be closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

(c) **APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969.**—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated.

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider—

(i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission;

(ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or

(iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.

(d) **WAIVER.**—The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations under this part without regard to—

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and

(2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT

10 USC 2687
note.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the "Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990" which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

(C) proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this part.

(b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—(1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 2905(a).

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) **REPORTS.**—(1) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during such fiscal year.

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the Commission shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congressional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3).

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the Commission, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of—

- (A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this part; and
- (B) any amount remaining in the Account.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2907. REPORTS

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of Congress—

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT

(a) **TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of section 2904(b), the term "joint resolution" means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), and—

(1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on _____", the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: "Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission".

(b) **REFERRAL.**—A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) **DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) **CONSIDERATION.**—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consider-

ation of the resolution (but only on the day after the calendar day on which such Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to do so). All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(f) RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY

(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States.

(b) **RESTRICTION.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the period specified in subsection (a)—

- (1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under consideration for closure or realignment; or
- (2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the United States.

(c) **EXCEPTION.**—Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry out—

- (1) closures and realignments under title II of Public Law 100-526; and
- (2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable, including closures and realignments carried out for reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) of such section.

SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS

10 USC 2687
note.

As used in this part:

- (1) The term “Account” means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1).
- (2) The term “congressional defense committees” means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.
- (3) The term “Commission” means the Commission established by section 2902.
- (4) The term “military installation” means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility.
- (5) The term “realignment” includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.
- (6) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Defense.
- (7) The term “United States” means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

- (1) by inserting “homeport facility for any ship,” after “center,”; and
- (2) by striking out “under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department” and inserting in lieu thereof “under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility.”

Part B—Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments

SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

10 USC 2687
note.

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of the Congress that—

- (1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity;
- (2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries;

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released to host countries in whole or in part by the United States should be handled on a facility-by-facility basis.

(b) **RESIDUAL VALUE.**—(1) For each installation outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, of the improvements made by the United States at facilities at each such installation.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(A) The term "fair market value of the improvements" means the value of improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use.

(B) The term "improvements" includes new construction of facilities and all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing facilities or to real property, without regard to whether they were carried out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(c) **ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is established on the books of the Treasury a special account to be known as the "Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account". Any amounts paid to the United States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account.

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in the United States. Funds in the Account shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIAANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES

(a) **USES OF FACILITIES.**—Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out "minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners" and inserting in lieu thereof "Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock incarceration facilities";

(2) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (3);

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4):

"(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for confinement or correctional facilities; and".

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990.

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that fiscal year, the sum of \$100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title II of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title.

(b) **EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING.**—(1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(b) **BASE CLOSURE ACCOUNT TO BE EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS.**—No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used for purposes described in section 204(a)(3) except funds that have been authorized for and appropriated to the Account. The prohibition in the preceding sentence expires upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title.”.

(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to the availability of funds appropriated before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) **TASK FORCE REPORT.**—(1) Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning—

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously.

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1). The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees):

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force.

(B) The Attorney General.

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration.

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.

(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by the head of the National Governors Association.

(G) A representative of a State attorney general's office, appointed by the head of the National Association of Attorney Generals.

(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

10 USC 2687
note.

**SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN CLOSURE AND
REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS**

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

(a) **NORTON AIR FORCE BASE.**—(1) Consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(1) of Public Law 100-526.

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees.

(b) **GENERAL DIRECTIVE.**—Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations.

**SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION
ACTIVITIES**

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEL PROGRAM.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration program.

(b) **ADMINISTRATOR OF PROGRAM.**—The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment as the Administrator of the model program referred to in subsection (a). The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(1).

(d) **PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.**—In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of Defense shall:

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for which preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 U.S.C. 541 et seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the contractor's breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract.

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following:

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies.

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest.

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria.

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, whichever is later.

(e) APPLICATION OF SECTION 120 OF CERCLA.—Activities of the model program shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620).

(f) EXPEDITED AGREEMENTS.—The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and concurrences.

(g) REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals of this section within the annual report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 10, United States Code.

(h) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW.—Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).

Appendix B

Section 2687, Title 10, U.S.C.

§ 2687. Base closures and realignments

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no action may be taken to effect or implement—

(1) the closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed;

(2) any realignment with respect to any military installation referred to in paragraph (1) involving a reduction by more than 1,000, or by more than 50 percent, in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation at the time the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress under subsection (b) of the Secretary's plan to close or realign such installation; or

(3) any construction, conversion, or rehabilitation at any military facility other than a military installation referred to in clause (1) or (2) which will or may be required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason of any closure or realignment to which clause (1) or (2) applies,

unless and until the provisions of subsection (b) are complied with.

(b) No action described in subsection (a) with respect to the closure of, or a realignment with respect to, any military installation referred to in such subsection may be taken unless and until—

(1) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, as part of an annual request for authorization of appropriations to such Committees, of the proposed closing or realignment and submits, with the notification an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of such closure or realignment; and

(2) a period of 30 legislative days or 60 calendar days, whichever is longer, expires following the day on which the notice and evaluation referred to in clause (1) have been submitted to such committees, during which period no irrevocable action may be taken to effect or implement the decision.

(c) This section shall not apply to the closure of a military installation, or a realignment with respect to a military installation, if the President certifies to the Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or a military emergency.

(d)(1) After the expiration of the period of time provided for in subsection (b)(2) with respect to the closure or realignment of a military installation, funds which would otherwise be available to the Secretary to effect the closure or realignment of that installation may be used by him for such purpose.

(2) Nothing in this section restricts the authority of the Secretary to obtain architectural and engineering services under section 2807 of this title.

(e) In this section:

(1) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility, which is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or Guam. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.

(2) The term "civilian personnel" means direct-hire, permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

(3) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.

(4) The term "legislative day" means a day on which either House of Congress is in session.

(As amended Pub.L. 98-525, Title XIV, § 1405(41), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2624; Pub.L. 99-145, Title XII, § 1202(a), Nov. 8, 1985, 99 Stat. 717; Pub.L. 100-180, Div. A, Title XII, § 1231(17), Dec. 4, 1987, 101 Stat. 1161; Pub.L. 101-510, Div. A, Title XXIX, § 2911, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1819.)

Appendix C

Final Criteria

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The availability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Appendix D

DoD Policy Memoranda

Index of Memoranda

- o Defense Base Closure and Realignment Procedures
(December 10, 1990)
- o Base Closure Policy Memorandum One -- Treating All Bases
Equally (January 7, 1991)
- o Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two -- Review
Requirements, Responsibilities and Controls
(February 13, 1991)
- o Base Closure Policy Memorandum Three -- Cumulative Impact,
Report Format and Other Guidance (March 7, 1991)
- o Base Closure Policy Memorandum Four -- Multiple Installation
Impacts (March 26, 1991)



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 DEC 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Defense Base Closure and Realignment Procedures

Background and Scope

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Public Law 101-510 (the "Act"), enacted new base closure and realignment procedures and established an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Applicability

Title XXIX, Part A of the Act establishes the exclusive procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may pursue closure or realignment of military installations, with the exceptions listed below.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Directors of the Defense Agencies, and the heads of other DoD components shall assess immediately all ongoing base closure, realignment and consolidation studies to determine the impact on each study of the new base closure and realignment legislation.

Exceptions

These new procedures and the guidance below do not apply to:

- o Implementing the closures and realignments under Public Law 100-526 (relating to the 1988 Base Closure Commission); or
- o Closures and realignments to which Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code, is not applicable.

Policy Guidance

Base closure, realignment or consolidation studies that could result in a recommendation for base closure or realignment, other than one covered by an exception above, must meet the following requirements:

o The studies, including their recommendations, must have as their basis the Force Structure Plan required by Section 2903 of the Act;

o The recommendations in the studies must be based on the final base closure and realignment selection criteria established under that Section; and

o The studies must consider all military installations inside the United States as defined in the Act (including those which the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommended for partial closure or designated to receive units or functions) on an equal footing, without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department of Defense.

Contract study efforts regarding base closures and realignments which must be redirected may be continued to the next contractual milestone. Study efforts for the 86 installations closed under Public Law 100-526 shall be completed.

Record Keeping

DoD components shall keep:

o Descriptions of how base closure and realignment selections were made, and how they met the final selection criteria;

o Data, information and analyses considered in making base closure and realignment selections; and

o Documentation for each recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to close or realign a military installation under the Act.

Submitting Recommendations

The Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Directors of the Defense Agencies, and the heads of other DoD components shall, by April 1, 1991, submit their recommendations for closures or realignments to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics for forwarding to the Secretary of Defense. They may not delegate responsibility for making these recommendations.

Compliance with Public Law 100-526

Consistent with the requirements of Section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretaries of the Military Departments shall take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the 1988 Base Closure Commission and shall take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall review their implementation plans for Public Law 100-526 to ensure that:

o All recommended closures and realignments will be initiated by September 30, 1991;

o All recommended closures and realignments will be completed by September 30, 1995; and

o Implementation plans are consistent with the temporary prohibition on military construction.

Implementation plans for Public Law 100-526 shall be revised in time to be included with the FY 92/93 Budget Justification. Budgetary impacts of the revised plans are due to the DoD Comptroller three days from the date of this memorandum.

Responsibilities

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics may issue such instructions as may be necessary to implement this memorandum and to ensure consistency in application of the selection criteria, methodology, and reports to the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and the Congress.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics shall be the exclusive point of contact for the Department of Defense with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.





PRODUCTION AND
LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-8000

January 7, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Base Closure Policy Memorandum One -- Treating All
Bases Equally

Section 2903(c)(3) of the FY 1991 Authorization Act directs the Secretary of Defense to treat all bases equally in considering them for closure or realignment, "without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department." In report language, the conferees stated they expect bases on the January 29, 1990, list of candidates to be "properly operated and maintained while this base closure process is implemented."

As you and your subordinate commands allocate FY 1991 operations and maintenance (O&M) funds to your military installations, care must be taken, until April 15, 1991, to treat all installations without regard to previous base closure or realignment lists. This requirement does not apply to actions falling below section 2687, title 10, U.S. Code thresholds or those actions under Public Law 100-526. Please report to me within two weeks of the date of this memorandum the steps you have taken to promulgate the above guidance throughout your components.

In addition, all bases must be treated equally when requesting waivers or exceptions to either the temporary prohibition on military construction or the moratorium on land acquisition. Consequently, justification that a base would never close or is not being considered for closure continues to have no bearing on the validity of such waiver or exception requests.



Colin McMillan

cc: CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT



PRODUCTION AND
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-8000

February 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Base Closure Policy Memorandum Two -- Review
Requirements, Responsibilities and Controls

Background

Title XXIX, Part A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (the Act) establishes procedures for closing and realigning bases. The Deputy Secretary's memorandum of December 10, 1990, established procedures for implementing the provisions of the Act. This memorandum is the second in a series of additional policy guidance for implementation of the Act. The first policy memorandum was dated January 7, 1991.

Final Criteria

The Deputy Secretary has approved the final criteria for recommending the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under the Act. The final criteria are at attachment (1).

Categories of Bases

The first step in the process of evaluating your base structure for potential closures and realignments must involve grouping bases with like missions or capabilities/attributes into categories, and when applicable, subcategories. Categorizing bases is the necessary link between the forces described in the Force Structure Plan and the base structure. Determining appropriate categories of bases is a Service and Defense Agency responsibility.

Capacity Analysis

Should you determine there is no excess capacity in a category/subcategory, you do not need to continue analyzing that portion of your base structure, unless there is a military value or other reason to continue the analysis.

Conversely, if you recommend a base for closure or realignment, your analysis must have considered all bases within that category/subcategory, as well as cross-category opportunities. If in applying the military value criteria, you find bases that are militarily/geographically unique or mission-essential (such that no other base could substitute for them) you may justify that fact and exclude these bases from further analysis.

Criteria Measures/Factors

You must develop and use one or more measures/factors for analyzing each of the final criteria. We recognize that it will not always be possible to develop appropriate objective and quantifiable measures or factors, and that they may vary for different categories of bases (whether they be objective or subjective).

Cross-Category/Multi-Service Opportunities

As you analyze your base structure, you should continually look for cross-category opportunities, and coordinate and cooperate with your sister Services and Defense Agencies to pursue multi-service asset sharing or exchange.

Internal Controls

Services and Defense Agencies must develop and implement an internal control plan for these base structure reviews to ensure the accuracy of data collection and analyses. At a minimum, your plan should include:

- o Uniform guidance defining data requirements and sources for each category of base,
- o Systems for verifying accuracy of data,
- o Documentation justifying any changes made to data submissions, and
- o Procedures to check the accuracy of the analyses made from the data provided.

Costs and Savings

Specific instructions follow for the calculation of health care costs, unemployment costs, and environmental costs and savings.

o CHAMPUS Costs. Base closures and realignments can impact CHAMPUS costs DoD-wide. These net cost impacts must be included in your analysis, regardless of which Military Department may eventually have to budget for such costs.

o Unemployment Costs. The Services and Defense Agencies annually budget unemployment contributions to the Federal Employees Compensation Account for DoD military and civilian employees. You should include the contributions attributable to closures and realignments in your cost calculations.

o Environmental Costs and Savings. Environmental Restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered in your cost calculations. DoD has a legal obligation for environmental restoration, regardless of whether a base is closed or realigned. Where installations have unique contamination problems requiring environmental restoration, these will be considered as a potential limitation on near-term community reuse of the installation.

On the other hand, environmental compliance costs or savings can be factors in a base closure or realignment decision. Environmental compliance costs can potentially be avoided by ceasing the existing practice through the closure or realignment of a base. Conversely, environmental compliance costs may be a consideration in determining appropriate closure, realignment or receiving location options.

Return on Investment

Return on investment must be calculated, considered and reported with your justifications for each recommended closure or realignment package. All costs and savings attributable over time to a closure or realignment package should be calculated, including costs or savings at receiving locations. Costs or savings elements that are identified, but determined to be insignificant, need not be calculated. However, your records should indicate that determination.

We have been working to improve the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model used by the 1988 Base Closure Commission. It shall be used for your return on investment calculations. Attachment two provides additional guidance on the model and return on investment calculations.

Impacts

Attachment three provides guidance on the calculation of economic impact on closing, realigning and receiving communities. Attachment four provides guidance on environmental impact considerations at closing, realigning and receiving locations, in addition to the environmental costs and savings considerations above.



Colin McMillan
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics)

Attachments

1. Final Criteria
2. Return on Investment Calculations
3. Economic Impact Calculations
4. Environmental Impact Considerations

Final Criteria

The final criteria to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under Title XXIX, Part A of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 are as follows:

In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first four criteria below), will consider:

Military Value

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Attachment (1)

Return on Investment Calculations

The Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model (used by the 1988 Base Closure Commission) is a useful tool to calculate return on investment for closure and realignment options. The model does not produce budget quality data. The model uses standard cost factors and algorithms to estimate costs and savings over time. It then calculates return on investment years and the 20-year net present value of a closure or realignment package.

In order to ensure consistency in methodology, Services and Defense Agencies shall use the improved COBRA model developed under the sponsorship of the Army's Total Army Basing Study (TABS) office. We recognize that Service and Defense Agency planning and accounting mechanisms are sufficiently different to warrant Service/Agency specific standard cost factors. Your documentation must justify use of such cost factors.

Return on Investment can be calculated as follows:

- 1) Array all the calculated costs and savings by fiscal year for the closure or realignment option. Costs and savings should be arrayed uninflated for 20 years.
- 2) Discount each year of the net costs or savings using a 10 percent discount rate.
- 3) Determine the fiscal year the closure or realignment is completed.*
- 4) Count the number of years, after the year of completion, it takes for the net present value to reach zero or become negative. This number is the return on investment years.
- 5) Sum the discounted net costs/savings for the 20-year period. This sum is the 20-year net present value.

OMB Circular A-94 applies to these calculations, in general, by specifying a 10 percent discount rate and zero percent inflation. Final criterion number five specifically applies to return on investment. If you have any questions, please call Mr. Dom Miglionico on (703) 697-8048 (AV 227-8048).

* The year of the closure is defined as the year in which the majority of personnel have left, and the mission and functions cease to be performed at the installation. For these calculations, a closure or realignment can be considered complete even if the installation is in caretaker status.

Economic Impact Calculations

The 1988 Base Closure Commission calculated economic impact by measuring the decrease or increase in direct employment in a community, county, or standard metropolitan district that would result at closing or realigning bases or at receiving locations. The General Accounting Office, in their review of the Commission's work, recommended that indirect employment impacts also be considered.

Economic impact on communities will be measured by the direct and indirect effect on employment at closing and realigning bases, as well as at receiving locations.

The Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) will develop computerized spreadsheets based on the formulae and rationale used in 1988, with the addition of appropriate multipliers to measure indirect economic impacts. OEA will provide a description of how they developed the formulae, rationale and multipliers, and how they are used in the calculations.

The Services and Defense Agencies will be responsible for determining changes in military, civilian and contractor (local on-base contracts only) employment at each base. This is the direct employment impact. The OEA spreadsheets have a place for entry of this data which will be a Service and Defense Agency responsibility. Once entered, the computerized spreadsheet will calculate the economic impact (the direct and indirect effect on employment) of the closure or realignment for each affected installation.

Attachment (3)

Environmental Impact Considerations

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM CLOSURE/REALIGNMENT ACTION AT:

Installation Name	Location
(Provide a <u>summary</u> statement and status for the following environmental attributes at each installation affected by the closure/realignment action, including receiving installations. These key environmental attributes are not meant to be all inclusive. Others may be added as appropriate.)	

- o Threatened or Endangered Species
- o Wetlands
- o Historic or archeological sites
- o Pollution Control
- o Hazardous Materials/Wastes
- o Land and Air Uses
- o Programmed Environmental Costs/Cost Avoidances

Attachment (4)



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-8000

March 7, 1991

PRODUCTION AND
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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
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DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Base Closure Policy Memorandum Three -- Cumulative Impact, Report Format and Other Guidance

Background

This is the third memorandum in a series of policy guidance for implementation of Title XXIX of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (the Act). The first two policy memoranda were dated January 7, 1991, and February 13, 1991.

Effect of Budget, Defense Management Review and Other Decisions

Civilian employment at individual bases can be affected by management decisions made at all levels, from installation commander up to the Secretary of Defense. We must report to the Commission when the cumulative civilian employment impacts of these decisions at an individual base call for reporting under the Act: specifically, when the cumulative impacts exceed the numerical thresholds of section 2687, title 10, U.S. Code (a civilian personnel reduction of 1,000 or 50 percent).

You should establish procedures to track all these decisions at installations where 300 or more civilian employees are authorized to be employed.

In general, DoD will aggregate employment impacts which would have been reportable, other than for the fact they were below section 2687 numerical thresholds. Specifically, to be considered part of a cumulative impact on an individual installation, each decision should:

- (1) Both reduce and relocate functions and civilian personnel positions from one installation to another; and
- (2) Involve management, consolidation or other decisions and not simply involve a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes; and
- (3) Be scheduled for initial implementation during FY 92 or FY 93.

When aggregating impacts, associated outyear (FY 94-97) employment impacts of decisions which meet the above guidelines shall be counted. Outyear employment impacts (FY 92/93 impacts) of earlier FY 90/91 decisions shall not be counted.

Those actions requiring reporting to the Commission in accordance with the above guidelines will need to have justifications including:

- (1) The relationship of each decision to the force structure plan and/or the FYDP; and
- (2) The relationship of each decision to the final criteria.

Actions With Multiple Installation Impacts

As you review your base structure or conduct functional studies with base closure or realignment impacts, you must determine whether a review or study impacting more than one installation should be considered a single action under P.L. 101-510.

To be considered a single action, the review or study must:

- (1) Result in the closure or realignment of at least one installation which would trigger the numerical thresholds of P.L. 101-510; and
- (2) Involve inextricably linked elements, in that failure to proceed with any one element of the action would require reevaluation of the entire action.

Receiving Bases

You must identify receiving bases for larger units or activities, including tenants, which are to be relocated from closing or realigning bases. The COBRA model will calculate the costs for relocating such larger units or activities. You do not need to identify specific receiving bases for units or tenants with less than 100 civilian/military employees. Finding homes for these activities can be left to execution. However, you should establish a generic "base x" within the COBRA model to act as the surrogate receiving base for each of these smaller units or activities.

Return on Investment

The following guidance applies to return on investment calculations for land value, force structure savings, and construction savings.

o Land Value. Services and Defense Agencies must estimate the value of land which can be disposed of as a result of a closure or realignment. Estimated land value will generally be based on the anticipated highest and best use for the land. You should assume appropriate zoning to allow the highest and best use. You must also take into account the impact environmental restoration activities could have on land value. Where installations have unique contamination problems, a portion of the installation may have to be segregated so the rest can be disposed of and community reuse can begin. Estimated land value needs to be adjusted for any such segregation, or where you anticipate reduced land value resulting from expected sales for less than unrestricted use.

o Force Structure Savings. The savings associated with force structure drawdowns shall not be included in your return on investment calculations. While decreased force structure will often be the underlying reason for recommending base closures or realignments, the savings associated with closing bases should be founded on the elimination of base operating support (BOS), infrastructure and related costs.

o Construction Cost Avoidances. Closing bases will result in construction cost avoidances. For FY 92-97, your cost avoidances should include the budgeted or programmed military and family housing construction, major repair and minor construction that can be avoided at the closing or realigning base. To calculate 20-year net-present value, extract the new-mission construction from the FY 92-97 total before you annualize the new total, and use that for each of the remaining fourteen years of the 20-year period. One exception to this guidance is where you have estimates for new-mission construction beyond FY 97. Those estimates shall be included in the cost avoidance total.

Community Preference

Services and Defense Agencies should establish procedures to give special consideration and emphasis to official local community closure or realignment requests received under section 2924 of the Act. You should document the receipt of such reports and the steps you have taken for possible review by the General Accounting Office, the Commission and the Congress.

Relocation Impacts

Where ammunition, chemical warfare agents or other materials which require special storage areas or facilities must be relocated, adequate safe accommodations must be assured at the receiving locations. Returns of such items from Southwest Asia or other overseas locations must also be considered as you analyze your base structure.

Environmental Impact Considerations

For environmental impact considerations, there is no need to undertake new environmental studies. You may use all available environmental information you or your subordinate activities have, regardless of when, how or for what purpose it was collected. If you should choose to undertake a new environmental study, the study must collect the same information from all U.S. bases in your base structure, unless the study is designated to fill gaps in information so that all bases can be treated equally.

Reporting Formats

The attachment describes the reporting formats for: (1) the anticipated DoD report to the Commission, and (2) Service and Defense Agency justifications for your April 1, 1991, closure and realignment recommendations.



Colin McMillan
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics)

Attachment

Base Closure and Realignment Report Format

Report to Commission
(Unclassified)

Unclassified Report

1. Executive Summary	<u>Responsibility</u> P&L
2. Introduction	P&L
- Background	
- Description of P.L. 101-510	
- Objective	
3. Force Structure Plan	OJCS
- Unclassified Version (Classified Version at Appendix F)	
4. Selection Criteria Development	P&L
5. DoD Policy Guidance	P&L
6. Description of Recommendations	Services/ Agencies
7. Budget Impacts (DoD Roll-Up)	P&L

Classified Appendices

1. Service and Defense Agency Analyses and Recommendations	Services/ Agencies
A. Army	
B. Navy	
C. USMC	
D. Air Force	
E. Defense Agencies	
2. Appendix F. Classified Force Structure Plan	OJCS

Base Closure and Realignment Report Format
Service and Defense Agency Analyses and Recommendations
(Classified)

1. Executive Summary

2. Statement of Purpose

- Background
- Applicable Specific Legislation
- Objective or Purpose
- Service Basing Concepts or Visions

3. Service Projected Force Structure (General Description)

4. Service Process

- Determination of Categories
- Capacity Analysis for Every Category
 - General Findings if Recommendations Resulted
 - Justification if No Recommendations Resulted
- Data Collection and Use
- Application of Final Criteria (General Description)
- Application of DoD Policy and Service Specific Guidance

5. Base Closure Account and Other Budget Impacts (Service Roll-up)

TABS: (One TAB for Each Category Where There is a Recommendation)

TAB A. Description of Analysis

- Description of Category
- Results of Capacity Analysis
- Application of Final Criteria
 - Measures/Factors
 - Role Each Final Criteria Played in Decision Process
- Recommendations* and Impacts
- Implementation Plan

TAB B. (Repeat as required)

* Each recommendation should describe the "package", including the receiving bases associated with the closure or realignment.



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-8000

March 26, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Base Closure Policy Memorandum Four--Multiple
Installation Impacts

I have reconsidered the DoD policy regarding actions with
multiple installation impacts which I issued on March 7, 1991.

The Department of Defense will only submit recommendations
to the Commission which meet or exceed the thresholds established
in Section 2687, title 10, United States Code. Actions which
depart from the recommendations of the 1988 Commission on Base
Realignment and Closure (established pursuant to Public Law 100-
526) must, however, be submitted to the Commission when such
departures are necessary to comply with the Force Structure Plan
and the final criteria.

General Counsel concurs.

Colin McMillan

cc: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretaries of Defense
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Comptroller
General Counsel
Inspector General
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
Assistant to the Secretaries of Defense
Director, Administration and Management

(Ed. note: On April 8, 1991, the Secretary of Defense decided to
include below threshold actions nominated by the Secretaries of
the Military Departments that had undergone the Services detailed
analyses and were based on the force structure plan and the final
criteria.)

Appendix E

Base Structure Summary

NUMBER OF MILITARY BASES

	<u>United States</u>	<u>Territories & Possessions</u>	<u>Foreign Areas</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	117	1	54	172
Navy	140	7	26	173
Air Force	206	2	52	260
Marine Corps	<u>22</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>26</u>
Total	485	10	136	631

NUMBER OF PROPERTIES

Army	1,255	15	962	2,232
Navy incl. Marine Corps	508	18	63	589
Air Force	<u>2,013</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>644</u>	<u>2,861</u>
Total	3,776	57	1,669	5,502

Notes:

1. The source for the above data is the DoD Base Structure Report for FY 1991.
2. The Number of Properties includes all land under the control of DoD regardless of size and includes the major military bases above.

Appendix F

History of Base Closures

Background

In the early 1960s, under the direction of President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara developed and subsequently implemented the most extensive base realignment and closure program in the history of the United States. Hundreds of base closures and realignments took place during this period, and more than 60 major bases were closed. Criteria governing bases selected for closure were established primarily within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with minimal consultation with the Military Departments or the Congress.

The Congress had not anticipated the broad extent of these actions, and their cumulative political impact was substantial. With very few exceptions, the closure actions were viewed negatively by the Congress.

Legislative History of Section 2687

In 1965, the Congress passed legislation setting up reporting requirements designed to involve itself in any DoD base closure program. The legislation was vetoed by President Johnson and the confrontation between the Executive and Legislative branches of government grew. Despite this situation, the Department of Defense was able to complete base realignments and closures routinely throughout the 1960s.

During the early 1970s, the Department found it increasingly difficult to realign or close installations due to repeated attempts by the Congress to regulate the base closure process and to limit or deny base closure funding. In 1976, the Military Construction Authorization Bill contained a provision prohibiting any base closure or reduction of more than 250 civilian employees until the Department had notified Congress of the proposed actions, assessed

the personnel and economic impacts, followed the study provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and waited nine months. This bill was vetoed by President Ford and the Congressional veto override effort failed.

In 1977, however, President Carter approved legislation requiring the Department to notify Congress that a base is a candidate for reduction or closure; prepare local economic, environmental, and strategic consequence reports; and wait 60 days for Congress' response. The legislation was codified as Section 2687, title 10, U.S. Code and is at Appendix B. Section 2687, coupled with the requirements of NEPA, effectively brought base closures to a halt.

The Next Decade

For the next decade after passage of Section 2687, all attempts at closing major installations met with failure, and even proposed movements of small military units were frustrated.

Given that situation, President Reagan's Administration began discussing with the Congress the development of a comprehensive proposal recommending base closures to Congress. The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (The Grace Commission) included in its 1983 report a finding that economies could be made in the base structure. They recommended that a non-partisan, independent commission be established to study the base closure issue in a less constrained process and submit a list of closures.

The 1988 Base Closure Commission

In 1988, Secretary of Defense Carlucci recognized that the stalemate between the Executive Branch and Legislative Branch had to be broken.

On May 3, 1988, Secretary Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure to recommend military bases within the United States for realignment and closure. Legislation subsequently passed by the Congress and enacted by the President (Public Law 100-526) endorsed this approach and provided relief from certain statutory provisions which were impediments to the completion of base closures.

Enactment of this legislation constituted an agreement between the Legislative and the Executive Branches that improvement in the military basing structure could be a means of realizing savings in the defense budget, while not impairing the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions.

The 1988 Commission's Recommendations


The 1988 Base Closure Commission issued its report in December of 1988. It recommended closing 86 military installations and realigning 13 installations. An additional 46 installations were designated for increases as units and activities relocated as a result of the recommended closures and realignments.

The 1988 Commission was required to base its recommendations on the force structure anticipated in 1988, which was stable. Even so, they recommended the closure of about 3 percent of the domestic base structure.

Implementing the 1988 Commission's Recommendations

Secretary Carlucci was required by Public Law 100-526 to accept or reject the 1988 Commission's recommendations in their entirety. In January of 1989, he accepted all of the recommendations. The law provided Congress with the same opportunity and by May of 1989, the Congressional review period expired without the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. Consequently, the recommendations of the 1988 Commission now have the force of law.

DoD's planning and budgeting for the 1988 closures is on track. The closures and realignments were authorized to begin in January of 1990 and must be completed by October of 1995. DoD's comprehensive financial plan for these closures indicates that DoD will realize a net savings during implementation (FY89-95) of over \$500 million and annual savings of \$700 million thereafter.



The January 1990 List of Candidates

The world situation was changing fast at the end of 1989 as DoD was preparing to send its revised FY 1991 Budget to the Congress. The Berlin wall had fallen, the Warsaw Pact was disintegrating, democracy was spreading throughout the region, and Soviet-U.S. relationships were improving worldwide.

It became clear that DoD's force structure and budget could decline dramatically over the next several years, in response to reduced tensions and threats worldwide. Base closures and realignments, therefore, became a part of each Military Department's budget strategy for balancing their base structure with their declining force structure.

The 1988 Commission, however, was a one-time Commission and without other changes to public laws, closing bases meant using the very same Section 2687 procedures that had stopped base closures for over a decade.

Since it could take 1-2 years to complete the required base closure and environmental impact studies, the Secretary of Defense decided he had to get started. In this way, DoD could have some studies completed in time to submit to Congress with DoD's FY 1992/1993 Budget in January of 1991.

In January 1990, the Secretary announced a list of candidates for closures and realignments which began the 1-2 year required study process.

The Current Law

Most of the January 1990 studies were never completed, for in November of 1990 Congress passed and the President signed Public Law 101-510 (see Appendix A). The law required that DoD begin its review of the base structure anew, without regard to the January 1990 list of candidates except when the study was below the numerical thresholds established by Public Law 101-510.

Appendix G

Index of Affected Bases and Impacts

Closure and Realignment Impacts* by Installation and State

State Installation	Action	Out Mil	Out Civ	In Mil	In Civ
ALABAMA					
Anniston Army Depot	Receive	0	0	0	366
Fort McClellan	Close	6,107	1,026	0	0
Redstone Arsenal	Receive	0	0	0	1,884
	Total	6,107	1,026	0	2,250
ARIZONA					
Fort Huachuca	Receive	0	0	9	47
Davis-Monthan AFB	Receive	0	0	355	41
Luke AFB	Receive	0	0	1,623	112
Williams AFB	Close	1,567	781	0	15
	Total	1,567	781	1,987	215
ARKANSAS					
Fort Chaffee	Close	2,617	671	0	0
Eaker AFB	Close	2,712	792	0	15
	Total	5,329	1,463	0	15
CALIFORNIA					
Sacramento Army Depot	Close	334	3,164	0	0
Fort Ord	Close	13,619	2,835	0	0
Castle AFB	Close	5,239	1,164	0	15
Beale AFB	Receive	0	0	588	193
Edwards AFB	Receive	0	0	766	336
MCAS Tustin	Close	4,105	348	0	0
Hunters Point Annex	Close	5	63	0	0
ICSTF San Diego	Close	276	41	0	0
MCB Camp Pendleton	Receive	0	0	137	78
MCAGCC 29 Palms	Receive	0	0	4,194	227
NAVCOMSTA Stockton	Receive	0	0	0	3
NAVMEDCOM NW Region	Receive	0	0	114	46
NAVSTA Long Beach	Close	9,519	833	0	0
NAVSTA San Diego	Receive	0	0	4,380	115
NAS Alameda	Receive	0	0	215	19
NAS Lemoore	Receive	0	0	5,945	231
NAS Moffet Field	Close	3,359	633	0	0
NAVHOSP Camp Pendleton	Receive	0	0	137	78
NCBC Point Hueneme	Receive	0	0	18	74
NOSC San Diego	Receive	0	0	0	1,140
NSC Oakland	Receive	0	0	874	1
NSSA Los Angeles	Close	0	29	0	0
NWC China Lake	Realign	0	160	0	29
NESEC Vallejo	Close	8	314	0	0
NESEC San Diego	Close	0	619	0	0
PMTC Point Mugu	Realign	0	190	2	33
	Total	36,464	10,393	17,370	2,618
COLORADO					
Lowry AFB	Close	4,052	2,290	0	15
Fort Carson	Receive	0	0	1,026	56
	Total	4,052	2,290	1,026	71

* Does not include workload adjustments.

Closure and Realignment Impacts* by Installation and State

State Installation	Action	Out Mil	Civ	In Mil	Civ
CONNECTICUT					
NUSCD New London	Realign	27	884	0	0
	Total	27	884	0	0
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA					
Air Force Audit Agency	Receive	0	0	0	45
NAVMEDCOM-NCR	Receive	0	0	45	15
NESSEC Washington	Close	41	162	0	0
	Total	41	162	45	60
FLORIDA					
Eglin AFB	Receive	0	0	559	22
MacDill AFB	Realign	2,773	231	0	0
NAS Jacksonville	Receive	0	0	583	44
NAVHOSP Pensacola	Receive	0	0	92	26
NTC Orlando	Close	15,736	1,148	0	0
NCSC Panama City	Realign	4	284	0	0
	Total	18,513	1,663	1,234	92
GEORGIA					
Moody AFB	Close	3,098	728	0	15
	Total	3,098	728	0	15
HAWAII					
NAS Barbers Point	Receive	0	0	978	36
NAS Pearl Harbor	Receive	4	0	432	0
NOSCD Kaneohe	Close	9	190	0	0
NSY Pearl Harbor	Receive	0	0	0	14
	Total	13	190	1,410	50
IDAHO					
Mountain Home AFB	Receive	1,200	0	To Be Determined	
	Total	1,200	0		
ILLINOIS					
Rock Island Arsenal	Realign	0	1,434	0	738
NTC Great Lakes	Receive	0	0	14,463	342
	Total	0	1,434	14,463	1,080
INDIANA					
Fort Benjamin Harrison	Close	3,437	1,103	0	0
Grissom AFB	Close	2,497	807	0	15
NAC Indianapolis	Realign	0	120	0	0
NAVWPNSPTCTR Crane	Realign	0	150	0	75
	Total	5,934	2,180	0	90
KENTUCKY					
NOS Louisville	Realign	2	235	0	0
Fort Knox	Receive	0	0	622	428
	Total	2	235	622	428

* Does not include workload adjustments.

Closure and Realignment Impacts* by Installation and State

State Installation	Action	Out		In	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<u>LOUISIANA</u>					
Fort Polk	Realign	12,672	1,132	8,885	793
England AFB	Close	3,042	697	0	15
Barksdale AFB	Receive	0	0	2,171	116
	Total	15,714	1,829	11,056	924
<u>MAINE</u>					
Loring AFB	Close	2,875	1,326	0	15
NAS Brunswick	Receive	0	0	425	20
	Total	2,875	1,326	425	35
<u>MARYLAND</u>					
Aberdeen Proving Ground	Receive	5	104	20	279
H. Diamond Lab, Adelphi	Realign	21	562	14	452
Fort Detrick	Realign	9	30	0	0
Fort Ritchie	Receive	0	0	24	155
NMRI Bethesda	Receive	0	0	17	16
NATC Patuxent River	Receive	0	0	143	1,813
NSWCD White Oak	Realign	5	1,701	0	0
NESEA St. Ingoes	Close	37	1,018	0	0
DTRC Carderock	Realign	0	0	0	363
DTRCD Annapolis	Realign	5	548	0	0
NOS Indian Head	Realign	2	30	0	0
	Total	84	3,993	218	3,078
<u>MASSACHUSETTS</u>					
Natick R & D Center	Receive	0	0	2	62
Fort Devens	Closed	1,662	2,178	0	0
	Total	1,662	2,178	2	62
<u>MICHIGAN</u>					
K.I. Sawyer AFB	Receive	0	0	2,022	116
Wurtsmith AFB	Close	2,903	705	0	15
	Total	2,903	705	2,022	131
<u>MISSISSIPPI</u>					
Keesler AFB	Receive	0	0	466	120
NAS Meridian	Receive	0	0	198	9
NCBC Gulfport	Receive	0	0	5	20
	Total	0	0	669	149
<u>MISSOURI</u>					
AVSCOM-TROSCOM	Realign	0	500	0	0
Richards-Gebaur ARS	Close	199	569	0	15
Fort Leonard Wood	Receive	0	0	5,238	764
	Total	199	1,069	5,238	779
<u>MONTANA</u>					
Malmstrom AFB	Receive	0	0	175	6
	Total	0	0	175	6

* Does not include workload adjustments.

Closure and Realignment Impacts* by Installation and State

State Installation	Action	Out Mil	Out Civ	In Mil	In Civ
NEBRASKA					
Offutt AFB	Receive	0	0	233	7
	Total	0	0	233	7
NEW JERSEY					
Fort Dix	Close	309	500	0	0
Fort Monmouth	Realign	1	223	0	0
Picatinny Arsenal	Realign	0	0	0	30
NAEC Lakehurst	Realign	8	86	10	89
NAPC Trenton	Realign	0	260	0	0
	Total	318	1,069	10	119
NEW MEXICO					
White Sands Missile Range	Realign	1	127	0	0
Cannon AFB	Receive	0	0	1,650	450
NWEF Albuquerque	Close	109	108	0	0
	Total	110	235	1,650	450
NEW YORK					
NAVSTA Staten Island	Receive	0	0	1,092	24
	Total	0	0	1,092	24
NORTH CAROLINA					
Pope AFB	Receive	0	0	575	22
NAVHOSP Camp LeJeune	Receive	0	0	86	20
	Total	0	0	661	42
OHIO					
Rickenbacker AGB	Close	600	1,129	0	15
Wright-Patterson AFB	Receive	0	0	189	959
	Total	600	1,129	189	974
PENNSYLVANIA					
Letterkenny Army Depot	Realign	0	738	0	600
NADC Warminster	Realign	237	2,030	0	0
NASO Philadelphia	Receive	0	0	5	135
NSPCC Mechanicsburg	Receive	0	0	2	63
NSY Philadelphia	Close	89	7,644	0	0
NAVSTA Philadelphia	Close	2,151	1,304	0	0
Tobynhanna Army Depot	Receive	0	0	0	445
	Total	2,477	11,716	7	1,243
RHODE ISLAND					
CBC Center Davisville	Close	5	133	0	0
TCCSMA Newport	Realign	18	20	0	0
NUSC Newport	Receive	0	0	25	1,024
	Total	23	153	25	1,024

* Does not include workload adjustments.

Closure and Realignment Impacts* by Installation and State

State Installation	Action	Out		In	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<u>SOUTH CAROLINA</u>					
Fort Jackson	Receive	0	0	2,993	589
Myrtle Beach AFB	Close	3,193	799	0	15
Shaw AFB	Receive	0	0	722	27
Charleston AFB	Receive	0	0	253	37
NAVHOSP Beaufort	Receive	0	0	44	15
NESEC Charleston	Close	4	363	0	0
	Total	3,197	1,162	4,012	683
<u>TENNESSEE</u>					
NAVHOSP Millington	Receive	0	0	69	18
	Total	0	0	69	18
<u>TEXAS</u>					
Fort Sam Houston	Receive	0	0	29	8
Fort Hood	Receive	0	0	12,672	868
Bergstrom AFB	Close	3,940	942	0	15
Brooks AFB	Receive	0	0	11	30
Carswell AFB	Close	4,659	884	3	15
Dyess AFB	Receive	0	0	168	14
Lackland AFB	Receive	0	0	416	104
Laughlin AFB	Receive	0	0	79	46
Randolph AFB	Receive	0	0	288	178
Sheppard AFB	Receive	0	0	663	207
NAS Chase Field	Close	733	914	0	0
NAS Kingsville	Receive	0	0	327	34
	Total	9,332	2,740	14,656	1,519
<u>VIRGINIA</u>					
ARI, Alexandria	Realign	3	54	0	0
H. Diamond Lab, Woodbridge	Close	0	90	0	0
Fort Belvoir	Realign	17	147	0	0
NAB Little Creek	Realign	5	0	10	376
NAVHOSP Portsmouth	Receive	0	0	119	40
NAVSTA Norfolk	Receive	0	0	660	0
NMWEA Yorktown	Close	12	206	0	0
NSCSES Norfolk	Receive	12	280	49	856
NSWC Dahlgren	Receive	0	0	4	1,002
	Total	49	777	842	2,274
<u>WASHINGTON</u>					
Fairchild AFB	Receive	0	0	1,401	122
McChord AFB	Receive	0	0	658	28
Fort Lewis	Receive	3,903	234	12,177	885
NAS Whidbey Island	Close	7,152	1,220	0	0
Naval Sub Base Bangor	Receive	0	0	94	15
NAVSTA Sand Pt. (Puget Snd)	Close	557	423	0	0
NAVHOSP Bremerton	Receive	0	0	96	36
NUWES Keyport	Realign	0	10	0	0
	Total	11,612	1,887	14,426	1,086

* Does not include workload adjustments.

Closure and Realignment Impacts* by Installation and State

State Installation	Action	Out		In	
		Mil	Civ	Mil	Civ
<u>MIDWAY_ISLAND</u>					
Naval Air Facility Midway	Realign	0	230	0	0
	Total	0	230	0	0

* Does not include workload adjustments.